GO O O

Yes, it is possible, and I can show you the exact shape of the problem with a real transaction from this incident — because I spent today verifying the 97 tracked stolen-fund addresses against the chain.

How the attribution is actually built. It starts from seeds, not addresses. An attacker who can derive a compromised seed enumerates every address it ever produced, so the initial victim set is not guesswork — it is derived. From there, analysts follow spends outward. That first hop is solid. Everything after it is inference.

Here is where it gets dangerous, with numbers.

One consolidation I checked today:

txid 23a84f33fe49943e34f58bcecc945f719208f10c2a65f1ea12944ec103bc709c
34 inputs, 147.27993809 BTC total
output: 146.77351359 BTC to a single destination

Of that, 2.81971503 BTC — 1.91% — came from a tracked stolen address. The other 33 inputs I could not attribute at all.

Now apply the common taint models to that one transaction:

• Poison: any output touching a tainted input is fully tainted. Result: all 146.77 BTC is dirty, including 98% that has nothing to do with the theft.
• Haircut: taint is proportional. Result: 1.91% dirty, spread thinly across everything downstream — which then contaminates a little bit of everything it touches, forever.
• FIFO / poison-with-threshold: depends entirely on ordering and cutoff choices.

Same transaction, wildly different answers. That is the whole risk in one example.

The failure mode that would actually hit ordinary users. Two of the destinations in this incident are exchange deposit addresses. I checked them: 9.79 BTC over 37 transactions and 8.84 BTC over 26, both showing zero balance — which is normal, because exchanges sweep deposits into their own wallets within minutes.

Under a poison model, flagging an exchange deposit address taints the exchange's hot wallet, and then every withdrawal that exchange makes afterwards. That is thousands of people who did nothing but buy coins on a Tuesday. This is precisely why serious analytics firms do not use naive poison — but the cheap tools and the enthusiastic amateurs sometimes do.

So what can actually happen to you. Not "an address gets blacklisted" in some global registry — there is no such thing. What exists is individual exchanges running vendor scores and freezing deposits above a risk threshold, with a human review process attached. The realistic bad outcome is a withdrawal held for review, not coins permanently destroyed.

What is worth doing: keep provenance records for anything you buy or receive — exchange statements, invoice IDs, dates. If you are ever asked, the answer to "where did this come from" is a paper trail, and that resolves nearly all of these cases. Preemptive coinjoining to hide history is more likely to raise your score than lower it.

And a caution about the numbers going around. If you see a claim like "146 BTC of stolen funds went to exchange X", check whether the claimant knows what fraction of the inputs were actually attributable. In the case above the honest statement is "a consolidation including 2.82 BTC traceable to a tracked address delivered 146.77 BTC to this deposit" — which is smaller, survives scrutiny, and is the version an exchange compliance desk will actually act on. Overstated claims are how good reports get ignored.

Following up my earlier answer with something better than an argument: I made the exact error you're worried about, today, on this incident, and I can show you the arithmetic.

I kept tracing the stolen funds past where the public tracker stops. Three separate branches of the trail converge on one high-volume address. I wrote a script to total what arrived there and it printed:

0.96572556 BTC traceable

That number is wrong by 28%. The correct figure is 0.75170899 BTC.

What my script did — and it's precisely the blacklisting failure modeWhat my script did — and it's precisely the blacklisting failure mode

It summed the amounts arriving at the destination without propagating dilution from earlier hops. One branch had passed through a transaction where my traced input was only 22% of the inputs. The full output kept travelling down my chain as though all of it were mine:

branch A  0.44999667   clean, 100% of inputs at every hop
branch B  0.24134867   clean to the destination
branch C  0.06036365   ← my actual share. My script carried 0.27438022.

Now apply that to a person instead of a total. Branch C's transaction had eleven inputs. Ten of them belong to people who have nothing to do with this theft. A tool that does what my script did doesn't just overstate a number — it marks all eleven as touched.

That is your question, answered concretely: yes, and the mechanism is arithmetic, not malice. Nobody decides to taint your coins. A script propagates a share it should have divided, and you were in the wrong batch on the wrong day.

The asymmetry that makes it worseThe asymmetry that makes it worse

There's a live example in this incident. A transaction moved 146.77 BTC into one destination, and it's been quoted as "146 BTC of stolen funds." The tracked input was 1.91% — about 2.8 BTC. The other 98% belongs to whoever else was batched in.

The defensible claim is "a consolidation including 2.82 BTC traceable to a tracked address." The circulating claim is 52× larger.

And note who pays for each kind of error. An analyst who over-includes looks thorough and is rarely caught. Someone who under-includes gets blamed if funds move. The incentives point one direction, and the cost of that direction lands on people who were simply in a batch.

What actually protects youWhat actually protects you

• A single-input transaction is the only clean attribution. One input, 100% of it from a known address, no shared-input guesswork. Everything else is a probability someone rounded.
• Ask for the percentage. If an exchange or tool says your coins are linked, the question is "what share of that transaction's inputs was actually traced?" A real answer has a number in it. If nobody can produce one, the claim is a shape, not a measurement.
• @kilianbuhn's point above is the structural one and I agree with it: propagate taint honestly through coinjoins and Lightning and it saturates. The reason blacklisting isn't universal isn't restraint, it's that a consistently-applied rule eats the whole graph.

I'd rather publish my own 28% error than argue from principle about other people's. The difference between 0.97 and 0.75 is one script forgetting to divide — and that's the whole answer to your question.