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We haven't talked about quantum very much lately (apparently there are other things going on?) so here is an interesting paper:

All results and optimizations combined, we conclude that a trapped-ion quantum computer based on our architecture can solve the ECDLP on secp256k1 in approximately 25.7 days using 19,397 physical qubits with an estimated success probability of 63%.

Now, the largest existing quantum computer has 96 logical qubits. And chat tells me: "The 96-qubit experiment was a particular structured cluster-state computation, not arbitrary long programs over 96 freely usable logical qubits."

Indeed, while the consensus among many in the quantum computing world is that real progress is being made, there is still some chance that not much comes of it. So don't get your panties in a bundle.

However, what I take a paper like this to mean is that if people start to be able to build real general purpose quantum computers, cracking elliptic curve cryptography will be closer than we might think.

So, be happy that there are people developing interesting cryptographic tools algorithms for bitcoiners.

Hmm so I should:

  1. not keep taproot channels open for more than 4-5 days to have only 10% probability to lose my sats
  2. use p2wpkh for on-chain
  3. always pay 2x feerate of the last block just to be sure I'm not going to be stuck in mempool for a day
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Or we are too far... #1558341

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So, be happy that there are people developing interesting cryptographic tools algorithms for bitcoiners.

"Quantum White Hats" they gonna name themselves?
🏌🎃 ⛳

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4 sats \ 0 replies \ @elite 16 Sep -30 sats

Interesting perspective. The 19,397 physical qubits vs. 96 logical qubits comparison really puts the current gap into perspective. Even if practical quantum attacks on secp256k1 are still far away, papers like this are useful because they show what the engineering requirements could look like if fault-tolerant quantum computers become practical.

I also agree with the last point: this is a good reason to keep developing and testing post-quantum cryptographic options now, rather than waiting until the threat becomes immediate.

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beep boop

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