In my opinion, this is the single most important theme in Munger's recent writings:

At the simplest level, liberalism requires humility and tolerance.

This stance leads to the following belief:

Following Adam Smith, I have argued for a presumption in favor of decentralized private choice and emergent institutions.

A more challenging statement for the denizens of this forum is this:

The state should not be dismissed as evil, but neither should it be romanticized as inherently good, a focus of moral value in and of itself. There are legitimate and difficult questions about whether there is a collective “will” that the state discovers and enacts. The most plausible, and modest, claim is that people use the technology of “state power” to provide mutual protection and achieve shared goals.

This bit is rather bang on:

Frustratingly, it is precisely that fact—that no one would accept limits on their own power—that justifies liberalism’s insistence on limitations on power in general. There are no people “good” enough to be entrusted with unlimited power; I am willing to accept exclusion from power as long as everyone else is, also.

And this sounds like it might be useful for thinking about bitcoin's own "governance" debate:

Sustainability depends on a constant, delicate rebalancing, and an acceptance that there is no permanent rule that settles these questions once and for all. Liberalism’s strength lies in the value of its conception of human nature: since the desire to rule, even just to do good, is universal, choosing or electing “good people” can never be enough. It’s not just that sometimes bad people will be elected, though that is true. The real problem is that even good people expand their capacity to direct and coerce everyone else; the only durable check on this impulse is a set of rules that might be chosen before anyone knows whether he will be the ruler or the ruled. (emphasis added)

Munger describes how people will take advantage of tolerance to the point of dismantling the circumstances which allow for it. And that in some cases it may be that intolerance is called for. But also that it is impossible to know when this is the case:

The veil of ignorance is no help, because authorities have to know which speech will be allowed and which will be curtailed or prohibited. The necessity of that kind of judgment creates new opportunities for the very abuse of power constitutions exist to prevent. There is no rule that resolves this in advance for every case. Every generation of liberals has to make that judgment again, under real uncertainty, knowing it might get the balance wrong in either direction—toward a tolerance that lets its enemies dismantle it or toward a militancy that becomes indistinguishable from the thing it was meant to stop.

Ultimately, he concludes:

Tolerance is only dangerous if humility is lacking.