For all of the media ballyhoo about the CHIPS Act, it really is a page out of the old five-year plans from the Soviet Union. The CHIPS Act will have the same success as befell the Soviets.

The U.S. share of global semiconductor fabrication capacity fell from about 36% in 1990 to about 10% in 2020. Policymakers became increasingly concerned about the potential implications of this trend for economic and national security reasons, and noted the risks associated with ensuring an adequate supply of semiconductors resulting from potential disruption of East Asian manufacturing and shipping due to trade disputes, natural hazards, or armed conflict. The COVID-19 pandemic and consequent interruption of semiconductor supplies to the United States—and the subsequent effects on U.S.-based industries—bolstered these concerns. U.S. overreliance on semiconductor production in East Asia and its vulnerability to disruption has been an ongoing source of concern for many Members of Congress.