Apple or Google can deny access to the backup. That has the same effect for the user as if Apple decrypted their backup - user looses the bitcoins. If the deny happens at the same time as the user losing their phone.
Would be more robust to have the backup stored in a location that does not require asking for permission to access.
Apple or Google can deny access to the backup. That has the same effect for the user as if Apple decrypted their backup - user looses the bitcoins. If the deny happens at the same time as the user losing their phone.
Would be more robust to have the backup stored in a location that does not require asking for permission to access.
That's definitely an interesting edge case, with this design you could keep the encrypted backups anywhere, where would you suggest?
No idea. Some redundancy would make it more robust, but may come at the expense of user experience. Email it to somebody?
rsync, you provide the server and ssh secret key in a config setting.
there are also comercial rsync backends, like rsync net.
Do you not understand that the solution should address mainstream usage and not for nerds?
rsync kills the entire premise. You might as well use a metal plate. Same target users...