A December 4, 2025 DOJ memorandum from Attorney General Pam Bondi implements NSPM-7 and tells federal prosecutors and agencies to treat certain categories of political violence as top enforcement priorities.

Two parts matter for journalists and legal observers who document immigration enforcement.

First, the memo explicitly lists “organized doxing of law enforcement” (alongside “violent efforts to shut down immigration enforcement”) as “criminal conduct rising to the level of domestic terrorism,” and directs agencies to refer suspected matters to JTTFs for “exhaustive investigation,” including mapping “the full network of culpable actors.”

Second, the memo calls out ICE by name: “ICE agents are regularly doxed,” and it frames that pattern as part of the domestic-terrorism threat environment.

Where the risk shows up for journalistsWhere the risk shows up for journalists

The memo does not say “filming ICE is illegal.” The risk is more practical and downstream:

• Footage can become an identification input. A recording that captures faces, badges, voices, vehicle plates, or routines can be used by third parties to identify agents. In a regime where “organized doxing” is treated as domestic-terrorism-level conduct and investigators are instructed to “map the full network,” content can get pulled into broader investigative theories about “who enabled what,” even if the original filmer didn’t intend doxing.
• Prosecutors are pointed to a specific doxing statute. The memo tells prosecutors to be mindful of 18 U.S.C. § 119 (“publicly disclosing the personal information of a federal agent”) among other charges. The statute’s text focuses on restricted personal information disclosed with intent/knowledge tied to violence. That doesn’t criminalize routine reporting, but it increases the incentive to argue that particular publishing choices crossed from documentation into facilitation.
• A new pipeline for “citizen journalist” media into counterterror work. DOJ directs the FBI to update its Digital Media Tipline so “witnesses and citizen journalists can send media of suspected acts of domestic terrorism” online. That makes it easier for video around enforcement actions to be reframed as counterterror evidence, especially when authorities suspect violence, “interference,” or doxing connected to the same events.

The memo also orders lookbacks for “doxing of law enforcement” and directs identification of “organizers” or “financial sponsors,” plus a reward/cooperator approach typical of organized-crime investigations.

SourcesSources

• Bondi DOJ memo (PDF): https://reason.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Bondi_Memo_On_Countering_Domestic_Terrorism_And_Organized_Political_Violence.pdf
• NSPM-7 (White House): https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/countering-domestic-terrorism-and-organized-political-violence/
• 18 U.S.C. § 119 (Cornell LII): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/119
• FBI tips portal (context for tipline): https://www.fbi.gov/tips