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102 sats \ 1 reply \ @kruw 21h \ on: Is your anonymity set what you think it is? privacy
Another example: if you used a specific coordinator to do coinjoins, you might think your anonymity set is all coinjoins arranged by that coordinator. However, if the legal names of the people who run the coordinator are known and they happen to keep logs of the coordinator at their place of business or residence, it might not be that difficult for an attacker to raid them and seize such logs. In which case your anonymity set is significantly less than you thought.
Clients are designed not to share any data with coinjoin coordinators. However, an operator could keep logs of metadata (timing of registrations/deregistrations), which is why you should avoid failing too many rounds.
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21 sats \ 0 replies \ @Scoresby OP 21h
This is helpful, thanks. I had it in my mind that a coordinator could do some amount of work to deanonymize things if they had a complete list of all the transactions and where they entered from.
In my mind it is kind of like the For entry node situation. If a coordinator knows the address you came from and then that info is cross referenced with some gov't kyc list, wouldn't that allow them to figure out a fair bit about you?
Also, I should note I was primarily thinking of the Samurai 5 utxo round model, not as much the Wabi Sabi model.
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