Maybe there's no problem at all - transaction fees might naturally grow to sponsor a robust security budget as Bitcoin adoption increases. But if the security budget does become insufficient as block subsidies fade, I explored whether we could create asymmetries that make 51% attacks economically unfavorable without requiring hard forks.
The Failed Attempt
The idea was to implement delayed fee mechanisms where transactions pay fees across multiple blocks - part released immediately, part unlocked as subsequent blocks build upon it. The theory: create different incentives for different miners, making honest mining more profitable than attacking.
For example: instead of paying 10k sats upfront, you'd pay 4k + 4k + 2k across three blocks. The thinking was that later miners would have extra incentive to build on previous blocks rather than orphan them, since they'd only receive those delayed fees by mining honestly.
Why It Doesn't Work
If this were to become the norm, evil miner would end up collecting those extra fees from the previous blocks anyway.
The Real Question
Is it possible to create an additional asymmetry that allows for the same level of protection with a lower security budget?
BTC/<fiat>
, but note that it could also become<energy>/BTC
on a Bitcoin standard - there is an element inside the "security budget" that can be adapted to any reduction on the reward side. Since miners collectively control the liquidity of newly minted coins and fees, they have a large influence on these exchange rates.BTC/<fiat>
miners need the exchange rate to go up and they have some influence over this, or in the case of an<energy>/BTC
pair, the cost of energy has to go down.block chain
), so all this means is that you have to wait more confirmations before you consider something safe, and actually monitorgetchaintips
- which you should already be doing but realistically, there's a 99% chance that a reader of this comment doesn't even know what the hell that is.