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I'm working to improve my coin control and privacy practices. My bitcoins currently sit on a Blockstream Jade and come from various traceable sources (exchanges, P2P, Alby, etc.).
I want to obfuscate these transaction histories.
My understanding so far:
Need to transfer from Jade to a hot wallet for coinjoining Sparrow offers "fake coinjoins" (Stonewall transactions) that work solo Real coinjoins require coordination but offer stronger privacy
Specific questions:
Workflow confirmation: Is Jade → hot wallet → coinjoin → new cold storage the right approach? Tool choice: Sparrow vs Wasabi for someone prioritizing hardware wallet integration? Stonewall vs collaborative coinjoins: When is fake coinjoin sufficient vs needing the real thing? Common mistakes: What privacy-killing errors should I avoid? UTXO management: Best practices for managing mixed vs unmixed coins?
I've read Sparrow's docs on private spending but would love real-world insights from those who've implemented robust privacy practices.
What's worked best for your setup?
Goal: Effective privacy without overcomplicating my security model.
117 sats \ 0 replies \ @hynek 26 Jun
You can use the only HWW with native coinjoin: https://wasabi.kravens.nl/#trezor
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512 sats \ 0 replies \ @anon 27 Jun
There are three main ways you could do it: Coinjoins, lightning, or monero.
Big coinjoins are decent but I think with the better privacy options we have available today they feel kind of outdated. More expensive for relatively weaker obfuscation. And the effectiveness of blinded coordinators not being able to deanonymize users has been called into question lately (Wasabi and Whirlpool. JoinMarket has other problems.)
I think hopping "off-chain", whether that is an L2 or via a different blockchain that is encrypted, is more effective since it wouldn't be obvious to any outside observer that you left and returned to Bitcoins blockchain in the first place. It would just look like any other normal transaction (when in reality it was a swap for something else "off-chain"). Much more difficult, if not impossible, to follow.
With a big coinjoin it is both fairly obvious that 1) it is a coinjoin and 2) that you own some of those inputs/outputs and later could be narrowed down further by mistakes of the other participants of that coinjoin, mistakes you made, and additional metadata
So that leaves Lightning and Monero. Different advantages.
Lightning could work, but depends on how much you're wanting to move around. Successful transactions are inversely related to how much you're sending. Could run into routing problems potentially.
Quick and dirty on the method I would use: BTC -> Monero -> BTC (swap back to BTC in different amounts to different addresses at random times over the course of a few days)
Recommend doing all this p2p using Retoswap or Bisq. Both use Tor by default. Don't use instant exchange websites.
If you want to try Lightning instead you could do pretty much the same method above just use Robosats. Use wrapped invoices when receiving on Lightning (Either with Zeus wallet or lnproxy.org)
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102 sats \ 1 reply \ @klk 26 Jun
You should do several rounds of coinjoining, ideally some as taker and some as maker. You can use JoinMarket for that.
An alternative is to swap in and out of Lightning Network. For less than 5M sats this is probably cheaper than the coinjoins. Tool: SwapMarket
It's important to understand your threat model and the sources.
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21 sats \ 0 replies \ @klk 26 Jun
For the receiver privacy in LN you can use something like https://lnproxy.org/ that's not custodial.
Another option that would be the cheapest is to use a custodial service like coinos to do the LN swapping. But I wouldn't do it for significant amounts tbh.
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17 sats \ 0 replies \ @anon 26 Jun
There aren't a lot of privacy options these days... for obfuscating on-chain. In the future a 'blend' of privacy and transparency will be most realistic as perfect privacy is really difficult.
Imo probably the most 'decentralized' survivable coinjoin available is joinmarket. Read about it here: #521035 https://github.com/joinmarket-webui/jam
Best of Luck
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the coinjoin wallet will take one seed and give you 4 address collections:
deposit_utxo mixing_utxo coinjoined_utxo busted_transactions
you send from jade->deposit
use the coinjoin tool to spend from deposit->mixing
Consolidate out of mixing->coinjoind
if anything goes awry, the utxo ends at busted
you might be able to restore the coinjoined_utxo address collection to your new hardware wallet, if you get your derivation path setup correctly. this would be helpful because you decrease anonymity if you spend more than one joined utxo at a time
somebody correct me if I'm wrong, plz
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Wait - doesn't Jade support HWI? Because at least Wasabi supports HWI.
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Update:
I had a little convo with Claude and passed to it some of my own thinking and understanding, and this is what I've come to:
The 3-Wallet System
  1. Old Wallet (Jade) - Contains traceable coins from exchanges, P2P, Alby, etc.
  2. Mixing Wallet (Sparrow Hot Wallet) - Temporary wallet for privacy operations
  3. Clean Wallet (New Hardware/Cold Storage) - Final destination, never connected to your identity
Initial Cleanup Process
Jade (old coins) → Sparrow (mixing) → New Clean Wallet Steps:
  1. Create new seed phrase for clean wallet (completely separate from Jade)
  2. Install Sparrow, create new hot wallet (different seed from both other wallets)
  3. Transfer coins from Jade to Sparrow mixing wallet
  4. Use Sparrow's "Privacy" toggle (Stonewall transactions) when sending
  5. Send from Sparrow to clean wallet using private transactions
  6. Wait days between each step - don't rush the process
  7. Use different amounts - avoid round numbers
  8. Send in batches rather than all at once
  9. Wipe Sparrow mixing wallet when done
It's not perfect, and not probably the "best", but from my understanding this is very well "good enough"
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