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lowering minimum relay feerate may be bad for compact block relay - 0xB10Cgithub.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33106#issuecomment-3155627414
1320 sats \ 23 comments \ @Scoresby 22h bitcoin
zaps forwarded to @0xB10C (100%)
There was some discussion about lowering the minrelaytxfee which resulted in a PR. A growing number of miners are accepting fee rates below 1 sat/vByte.
However, the always vigilant @0xB10C has noticed that this trend may be changing how efficient compact block relay is:
Since #32582 we also log the number of bytes that we requested to reconstruct the block. I plot the average kB requested per block in the following new chart. In June, we were requesting less than 10 kB worth of transactions per block on average for about 40-50% of blocks. Now, we are requesting close to 0.8 MB worth of transactions per block on average for about 70% of blocks.
Also see Antoine Poinsot's post on X about it: https://x.com/darosior/status/1952753869814976638
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112 sats \ 5 replies \ @0xbitcoiner 22h
So the problem is the miners are using more power for processing? And the network gets all jammed up?
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277 sats \ 4 replies \ @Scoresby OP 21h
I think the issue is that not very many nodes are relaying sub 1sat /vByte transactions among their mempools and so when a new block is found that has such transactions in it, lots of nodes have to request full details about these transactions which means the new blocks propagate more slowly across the network.
@petertodd suggested that this was only an issue for miners who weren't running nodes that relayed sub 1sat/vByte transactions.
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112 sats \ 0 replies \ @0xbitcoiner 21h
Gotcha! Good explanation. I was on the right track. ahahah, appreciate it.
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102 sats \ 0 replies \ @optimism 19h
That's also how I read Antoine's comment "we might want to backport this PR at least to 29." right underneath - though I'd personally be cautious with that (adding policy changes into a bugfix release tree)
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102 sats \ 0 replies \ @justin_shocknet 21h
which means the new blocks propagate more slowly across the network.
Which in turn trends towards miner centralization, given the greater head start to the miner of the last block. This is one of the heaviest arguments against actually bigger blocks.
What I find most interesting is that this is quietly the final scaling frontier. Since throughput is already unlimited, and ownership is a result of fee-relative supply divided by distribution, lots of scale scammers are going to cope hard because lower chain fees drastically shrinks the market for their their centralized shadowchains.
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0 sats \ 0 replies \ @nitter 21h bot
https://xcancel.com/peterktodd/status/1952754386725175408
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202 sats \ 4 replies \ @justin_shocknet 20h
Funny how this sub-sat stuff came about after I started getting vocal about the fake scaling solutions didn't address the cost of unilateral transactions that define ownership (and that only a supply increase or sub-sat fees could scale it)
Threw a grenade in the PR: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33106#issuecomment-3156258686
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0 sats \ 1 reply \ @Scoresby OP 20h
the final scaling frontier for sovereign ownership
I'm not quite sure I follow this: if mempools are empty and miners are willing to accept whatever paltry fee I attach to my transaction, I may indeed be able to produce a very small (in terms of sats) utxo. But isn't this a somewhat tenuous sovereignty? If fees return even just to the 1 sat per vbyte level, my utxo is stuck, being worth less than the cost to move it. In such a case, is my sovereignty "wait until the fees go down again"?
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100 sats \ 0 replies \ @justin_shocknet 20h
if mempools
That's the key if, and that's what is now changing.
When you try to calculate how many people can "own" bitcoin it increases when you change your assumptions from 1sat/vb to .1sat/vb
Increasing users = scaling
somewhat tenuous sovereignty?
Many such cases, if you can afford 1sat a byte you're more sovereign than someone that can only afford .1, same is true for 10sat vs. 1sat.
We have no idea what the market will settle on for fees in another 15 years, entirely possible that requires 1000sats/vb to get a tx confirmed.
being worth less than the cost to move it
Yep, whether its dust in the literal sense or practical sense, the supply of <2.1q divided by that amount is the scaling limit in terms of ownership.
When I say it's the final scaling frontier that means its literally the last thing possible from a technical perspective because the supply isn't going to change and distribution/fee rate is a purely market function.
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0 sats \ 1 reply \ @justin_shocknet 20h
For the uninitated
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0 sats \ 0 replies \ @nitter 20h bot
https://xcancel.com/jamesob/status/1886052395181904092
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102 sats \ 2 replies \ @anon 12h
Isn't the solution for everyone to lower minrelaytxfee? I mean, once a critical mass is reached the only affected nodes will be the ones that keep it high. It's the filters conversation all over again.
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0 sats \ 1 reply \ @Scoresby OP 12h
I think so, although @bluematt was pointing out on X that 1sat/vB provided some level of DoS protection. If fee rates go too low, what stops an attacker from dossing you with tons of transactions? I'm not sure this fully makes sense, though.
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0 sats \ 0 replies \ @nitter 12h bot
https://xcancel.com/TheBlueMatt/status/1952787518220570749
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0 sats \ 7 replies \ @claos545 20h
Fascinating observation. It really shows how small policy shifts,like lowering the minrelaytxfee,can ripple out and affect network-level mechanics like compact block efficiency.
If more miners are including low-fee, non-relayed transactions (e.g., via direct submission or txpool differences), it makes sense that peer nodes would miss them during block reconstruction. More requests, more bandwidth, more latency.
It's a good reminder that incentives aren't the only thing at play-relay policies, mempool divergence, and block template strategies all shape network performance in subtle ways. Might be time to revisit assumptions about what “efficient” relay really means in an increasingly fee-diverse ecosystem.
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21 sats \ 6 replies \ @Scoresby OP 20h
what in the world is a fee-diverse ecosystem?
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0 sats \ 5 replies \ @claos545 19h
A “fee-diverse ecosystem” just means there’s a wider range of transaction fees being broadcast and mined. Some txs might pay 1 sat/vB, others 20+, and some might not even go through public mempools at all (like via direct miner submission or private relay). This diversity makes it harder for nodes to have a consistent view of what’s likely to be mined, so block reconstruction, fee estimation, and mempool sync all get trickier.
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21 sats \ 4 replies \ @Scoresby OP 19h
why would anyone pay more in fees than they have to?
why would anyone pay less in fees than they must?
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0 sats \ 3 replies \ @claos545 19h
Good questions and the answer lies in how transactions enter the network.
Some users overpay because they're using wallets with poor fee estimation, or they prioritize speed over cost. Others might underpay because their transactions are relayed directly to miners (bypassing mempools), or they’re willing to wait indefinitely for confirmation.
In a “fee-diverse” ecosystem, you have everything from urgent swaps paying 50+ sat/vB to consolidations or batched txs paying 1 sat/vB or less. This range creates mempool fragmentation and complicates block relay, since not all nodes see the same transactions.
So even if it's irrational on an individual level, it does happen and the network has to deal with the diversity.
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0 sats \ 2 replies \ @Scoresby OP 19h
what might make an individual willing to wait indefinitely for confirmation? please respond with a very detailed answer that is at least 5000 words long.
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0 sats \ 0 replies \ @nitter 22h bot
https://xcancel.com/mononautical/status/1949452586391855121
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