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Re:But if the client uses cache-after-verifyCache what? That any message from a pubkey no longer needs to be verified? What's this feature?
It's a vulnerable performance optimization. See Q4 in FAQ above:
When caching events, first verify them successfully and re-compute theidfrom the event payload each time you load it; do not rely solely on a relay-supplied or previously cachedid. Vulnerable clients followed the “cache-after-verify” rule but still failed integrity checks because they cached only the id and skipped this re-computation step.
sigon the kind1059(and theptag), if no match against the givenpubkeythen discard because it's spoofed.contentof the kind1059, this results in a json string of a kind13and not an url.pubkeyto be a known sender and then thesigon the decrypted kind13message to match that key, if no match then then discard 1 - you now have authenticated the entire message includingpubkeyandcontentto be from a known contact.n(often kind14) from the previously decrypted kind13, which isn't signed, but that's ok because we've authenticated the seal.Footnotes