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Since the Second Amendment to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement in 1978, the IMF cannot require gold as collateral for loans.
Under the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement, passed in April 1978, the IMF has no authority to buy gold or engage in gold transactions such as loans, leases, swaps, or use gold as collateral.1
So today, IMF lending is based on a country’s quota (its shareholding in the IMF), policy commitments, and repayment capacity — not on pledging gold.
However up until 1971, when dollar was depegged from gold by the U.S., IMF indeed used to acquire gold from the member countries and creditors:
  1. At the IMF’s founding in 1944, member countries paid 25 percent of their initial quotas in gold. They did the same with quota increases over the next three decades. These payments represent the largest source of the IMF's gold.
  2. Members normally paid all interest owed on IMF credit in gold.
  3. Members also could use gold to repay credit extended by the IMF.
  4. Members seeking to acquire another member’s currency could do so by selling gold to the IMF, as South Africa did in 1970–71.
That said, governments sometimes sell their gold in order to cover some losses caused by the unravelling crisis, but these sales are never directly presented as a "payback". Such sales are often announced as a "sovereign decision" or a "bilateral agreement", not the fulfillment of the IMF demand.
I strongly recommend Alex Gladsteins's "Structural Adjustment". It doesn't touch on the gold repayments topic, but is a great eye opener for those who really want to understand how IMF works.

Footnotes

I read the article from Alex, and while I understand what he means (I am myself no fan of IMF, or technocrats doing central planning), seems like a lot of his agendas/angers are misplaced, and points to him having his own agendas.

Friend of Dictators?

While the basic assertion is valid, that IMF regularly engages with dictatorial regimes, I fail to see what's IMFs fault here. Was the IMF meant to be like the CIA, in charge of regime change and coupe whenever it deems appropriate? IMF, purely as a financial institution, deals with the regognised state representative of each nation. Whether those representatives enjoy or were elected via democratic support, is simply outside the IMF mandate. IMF's job is not primarily to meddle in the internal politics of a nation to satisfy layers and layers of sub-national governmental entities or individual families. Internal political reform is still firmly the responsibility of the individual nations and their people (to the extend they care or have any awareness).
Then, the rest of the demands of IMF? They come into play only when a country is seeking bail out from the IMF. A creditor does have full right to audit, and, to some extent, control the debtor's decision as the creditor is exposed to the risk of debtor's actions. If a country is financially self-sufficient enough (by which I do not mean isolated, but one that does not need aid or loan from the IMF), then it is fully sovereign to implement its domestic agendas as it pleases. What exactly is surprising or unexpected in it?
I am not defending the IMF, but trying to be objective here as much as possible. In general, I have no love lost for IMF if more countries just decide they can conduct their own trade settlement and balance the budget just fine without IMF, hence choosing to totally opt out. That will significantly reduce IMF influence as a lender of last resort and that is also where Bitcoin will have a chance to flourish as a final global trade settlement layer.
But, if a country X goes hat in hand to another entity Y (which may be IMF, or the CCP or ECB or whatever) asking for money, then X has to be ready to sacrifice part of its sovereignty and decision making. There is no two way around it. You cannot be a debtor seeking a bailout and favour, while acting strong and mighty as if you are in charge of your destiny.
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