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11 sats \ 9 replies \ @ek 7h \ parent \ on: How to Verify the Impact of the Recent NPM Attack on My Wallets? bitcoin
If it swaps the address, you know which one you entered. Compare that one with the one it tells you you entered. No external signer needed.
I assume the swap happens before signing. But if it happens after signing, this means the attacker can also sign, in which case they would just drain your wallet immediately.
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0 sats \ 8 replies \ @adlai 3h
deleted by author
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6 sats \ 1 reply \ @ek 3h
your logic is about a hypothetical attacker who is currently authoring malware
my logic was about backing up my assumption that it swaps before signing because I did not read the malware code
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0 sats \ 0 replies \ @adlai 3h
half the bloody problem is that there is too much code. I think it's been this way for longer than NASDAQ, although I'm younger.
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0 sats \ 5 replies \ @ek 3h
wdym with "payload might not include exfil"?
if an attacker can sign whatever they want, why wouldn't they drain the wallet?
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0 sats \ 4 replies \ @adlai 3h
I have not read any of the theft complaints. I have no idea how anything signed leaves the browser.
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5 sats \ 3 replies \ @ek 3h
the malware swaps the address. so when you sign without double-checking the address, you're actually signing a tx to the attacker. you're then broadcasting that tx like you would normally. that's how anything signed leaves the browser or wallet.
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0 sats \ 2 replies \ @adlai 3h
deleted by author
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0 sats \ 1 reply \ @ek 3h
yes, which is what I said because the malware has to swap the address before you sign
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0 sats \ 0 replies \ @adlai 3h
the details of my criticism depend on the UX of the target attacked by the payload. by my understanding, if the payload only detects and swaps addresses, then our entire discussion is the real scam, donating our sats to the rest of the community.
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