15 sats \ 12 replies \ @nerd2ninja 25 Jan 2023 \ on: Drivechain and the Side Effects of Bitcoin's Blocksize War bitcoin
I'm noticing that this man is full of bullshit. The meta consensus "problem" is a feature. If people don't like your change, their money is protected from your nonsense. We don't want miners to decide changes either, because they have incentives that do not take into consideration what users want and what node operators need aka their incentives don't take in the full picture. Miners are paid security.
So then does drive chains "solve the meta consensus problem?" Yeah, because the only way to get a sidechain is beg a miner to enable it, but that's a bug not a feature.
I mean he's describing people who know better, who are criticizing changes as people who just want to reject all changes and that's not freaking true! We all agreed on taproot. We're just being very careful with the main chain because if we fuck it up, there's no way to really undo a soft fork. "Then do it in a sidechain" but sidechains are going to make miners decide what Bitcoin is whereas right now users decide what Bitcoin is.
Like, yeah we need this softfork that miners don't really like but its going to be good for users and users want it, but oh no, I better not run that client because my funds are locked in a sidechain and the miners won't release my Bitcoin from that sidechain into aUASF client only a URSF client written by Bitmain!
It completely changes the dynamic of power that users have with miners.
but more than this, pauls own proposals exacerbate the meta consensus problem ironically, since he intends to go the speedy trial MASF route to activate them.
That's a whole can of whip ass meta consensus worms in the making, to the point where I think that may be the primary intent. to make the activation as contentious as possible.
For now, I see drive chains the proposal as a possible trojan horse to attack Bitcoin. AND the proposal itself as not well thought out in terms of implications for Bitcoin proper. Which should be the priority.
ie drivechains serve themselves more than they serve Bitcoin.
porting over shitcoin systems to be interoperable with Bitcoin's base layer seems like a bad idea on multiple levels, and that is what drivechains enable.
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We don't want miners to decide changes either, because they have incentives that do not take into consideration what users want and what node operators need
Drivechain doesn't change the status quo which is that the economic majority decides on changes.
That said, I want to dig into what you said here. From my perspective, miners are completely beholden to users. If they so much as look in the wrong direction, BTC price tanks and the coinbase value crashes; if they mess with the chain, fewer users will use bitcoin and so they will earn less fee revenue. In both cases, not doing what users want leads directly to financial loss. What incentives do you think miners have that do not take into consideration what users want?
there's no way to really undo a soft fork
soft forks can be undone with another soft fork. a soft fork rule can be implemented that disallows txs that are compatible with the soft fork you want to un-do. so users can "exit" the soft fork rules, but not "enter" them.
"Then do it in a sidechain" but sidechains are going to make miners decide what Bitcoin is whereas right now users decide what Bitcoin is.
how are sidechains going to make miners decide what bitcoin is?
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You will never understand until you go out of your way to understand why the result of the block size wars turned out the way it did. Until you read and learn about the New York agreement.
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I was there, literally: at the time, I worked for a company that signed the NYA... a somewhat awkward position to be in since I did not support the Segwit2x proposal, though to the leadership's credit they were also tolerant of my differing opinion. I rallied in support of the UASF and extensively documented the different ways the fork could go. Suffice to say, I understand :)
So, with the bona fides and qualifications out of the way, are you willing answer my question?
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Then I need to restate myself.
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I do not believe all miners will contribute to sidechains a. Not every block, and I don't think even most blocks, will contain the W^1 spending condition alteration needed to spend out of a sidechain b. This means that less than 51% of the hashpower is needed to denial of service attack a sidechain
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Financial threat a. Users threaten miners with financial turmoil b. Drivechain means miners can financially threaten users by denying the ability to spend out of a sidechain. How? See point 1.
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Financial enablement a. A large sidechain userbase needs access to their funds. In order to do so, they enable miners who financially threatened them, by using the chain "that works". This creates a feedback loop wherein the economic majority is in the interest of the miners and what the users want, they can only get by enabling the miners. b. This is all made possible by point 1.
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- I do not believe all miners will contribute to sidechains a. Not every block, and I don't think even most blocks, will contain the W^1 spending condition alteration needed to spend out of a sidechain
Conjecture, but let's roll with it for the sake of argument, because it is a possible scenario to consider.
b. Drivechain means miners can financially threaten users by denying the ability to spend out of a sidechain. How?
This seems like a MAD (mutually assured destruction) scenario to me: miners hit users in their pocketbooks, but users can also hit the miners back. Sure miners can mess with drivechain users but if they do that, they risk destroying confidence in the whole drivechain concept, which will cost them revenues not just on the chain they are DoSing but also on all other drivechains as users flee those chains scared that they might be DoSed next. And if mainchain users hear about bitcoin miners attacking a drivechain, they might begin to worry if the mainchain is next on the chopping block, causing an attrition of mainchain users as well. Sounds like a lot of risk to these attacking miners for... what gains exactly?
a. A large sidechain userbase needs access to their funds. In order to do so, they enable miners who financially threatened them, by using the chain "that works". This creates a feedback loop wherein the economic majority is in the interest of the miners and what the users want, they can only get by enabling the miners.
Having trouble parsing this part, could you rephrase or clarify? Will point out specific parts that don't make sense to me:
enable miners who financially threatened them, by using the chain "that works"
what chain are you referring to? what exactly do you mean by "enable"?
This creates a feedback loop wherein the economic majority is in the interest of the miners and what the users want, they can only get by enabling the miners
What exactly do you mean by "the economic majority is in the interest of the miners"? How exactly does the "feedback loop" you're referring to work?
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Remember when LND broke? Twice? Some people just want to see things break.
The chain I'm reffering to is the forked chain. Remember this scenario is about miner power vs user power to push a consensus change.
The economic majority. The people who are buying bitcoin (which will make it more valuable) will dump coins from the obviously broken chain which is now its own token and technically can't be called bitcoin anymore. This drives hash power.
Enable as in to allow or empower someone to do something. Especially something they couldn't do without your help
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But how the miner knows that you run UASF
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By the simple fact that isn't compatible with a URSF. In this scenario, the miners create a Bitcoin client to reject a UASF which causes a hard fork.
When a UASF node runner attempts to do something sidechain related in that version of the chain, everyone can see W^+1 for that spend condition.
I suspect most miners will select for the "do nothing" action when mining a block rather than the W^ action. Which means only a group of interested miners are influencing this side chain you're apart of. There will be many (if not most) chains in which small interested mining groups attack sidechains in the UASF chain to encourage users to run a URSF client and get access to their funds.
This is not a 51% attack and it does not mean 51% of Bitcoins hash power is being used to attack Bitcoin
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yep
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