Background: #1285845
Something happened today that should worry anyone who cares about how courts work.
The Supreme Court issued a stay in a Texas redistricting case. On the surface: routine. States appeal, stays get granted, life goes on.
But look closer and you’ll see something alarming: the Supreme Court just substituted its judgment for 160 pages of trial-court factfinding. And in doing so, it stretched three separate legal doctrines past their breaking point.
The Story
Texas redrew its congressional maps in August 2024. Civil rights groups sued, claiming racial gerrymandering. A three-judge District Court held a five-day trial, heard live testimony, reviewed documents, and ruled: Texas illegally prioritized race when drawing district lines.
Texas appealed. The Supreme Court—without oral argument, without briefing on the merits—blocked the ruling.
The majority said: the District Court got it wrong.
The dissent said: you’re not supposed to do that.
What the Majority Did
The majority deployed three arguments, each grounded in real doctrine:
1. The presumption of good faith (Grade: B–)
Courts presume legislatures don’t discriminate. Fair enough. But the District Court explicitly applied that presumption, then explained why the evidence overcame it. That’s how presumptions work—they’re starting points, not shields.
The majority’s move: re-weigh the evidence and disagree with the trial court’s conclusions. That’s not applying a presumption. That’s substituting judgment.
2. The alternative map requirement (Grade: B)
In Alexander v. South Carolina (2024), the Court said plaintiffs need to show an alternative map. Texas says they didn’t, so Texas wins.
But Alexander also says that requirement “is not dispositive” when there’s strong direct evidence of racial intent. The District Court found exactly that—contemporaneous statements, DOJ warnings, legislative testimony.
The majority treats the alternative map requirement as automatic. Alexander doesn’t.
3. Purcell principle (Grade: C+)
The doctrine: don’t change election rules on the eve of an election.
The problem: the election is 11 months away.
Purcell has never been applied this early. It’s about imminent chaos—ballots printing, voters confused, no time to adjust. None of that applies here. And Texas created the timeline by redrawing maps mid-cycle.
The dissent nails it: Purcell is being stretched beyond recognition.
What the Dissent Said
The dissent didn’t argue policy. It argued structure.
Clear-error review exists for a reason (Grade: A)
Trial courts find facts. Appellate courts review for clear error. You don’t reverse just because you would have weighed evidence differently.
This is bedrock procedure. Cooper v. Harris, Miller, Bethune-Hill—all say racial gerrymandering cases turn on trial-level factfinding. Appellate courts defer unless findings are implausible.
The majority never says the District Court’s findings were implausible. It just disagrees. That’s not appellate review—that’s being a trial court.
There was direct evidence (Grade: A–)
The District Court didn’t infer racial intent from demographics. It had:
- Contemporaneous legislative statements
- DOJ correspondence warning about racial implications
- Governor’s framing of redistricting goals
- Testimony from map-drawers about prioritizing race
This is classic direct evidence. And under Cooper, trial courts can credit it—especially when credibility matters.
The majority says it’s “ambiguous.” But ambiguous evidence gets resolved by the factfinder. Not re-weighed on appeal.
The stay decides the election (Grade: B+)
Here’s the real stakes: if Texas uses this map in 2026, the case becomes moot. The Court says this is “preliminary,” but it’s not. The stay is the outcome.
Stays in election cases are increasingly becoming de facto merits rulings. And that should concern everyone.
The Scorecard
Majority:
- Presumption of good faith: B–
- Alternative map: B
- Purcell: C+
- Clear-error doesn’t apply: C
Dissent:
- Clear-error review controls: A
- Direct evidence: A–
- Purcell doesn’t apply: A
- Majority acting as factfinder: A
On the law—just the law—the dissent is stronger. Not close.
Why This Matters
The majority isn’t inventing doctrine. These are real legal principles.
But the way they’re applied here is surgical: each doctrine gets stretched just enough to justify intervention. And together, they bypass the constitutional structure of appellate review.
Trial courts exist to find facts. They hear witnesses, assess credibility, weigh evidence. Appellate courts review for legal error and defer to factfinding unless it’s clearly wrong.
That’s not a technicality. It’s the design. And today, the Supreme Court ignored it.
The Bottom Line
The Supreme Court said a trial court “probably got it wrong” after a five-day trial with live testimony and a 160-page opinion.
It applied Purcell 11 months before an election—something it’s never done before.
It treated rebuttable presumptions as automatic wins.
And it did all this without hearing argument or reviewing the full record.
The dissent’s warning: this isn’t about Texas. It’s about what appellate courts are allowed to do. And today’s stay crossed a line.
On strictly legal grounds, they’re right.