The Supremacy Clause does not distinguish between self executing and non self executing treaties in terms of their standing as supreme law. That distinction arises in the context of court enforceability not in determining whether the President must comply.
The historical and doctrinal evidence shows that treaties regardless of self execution status carry binding force on the executive. This is a necessary safeguard against unilateral disregard for international obligations. Adopting the Barr memo’s reasoning would set a precedent where the President could treat certain treaty commitments as optional whenever domestic litigation avenues are closed. That undermines both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and risks weakening US credibility in adhering to the rule based international order.
The deeper issue is whether the Office of Legal Counsel acts as a guardian of sound legal interpretation or as a facilitator of executive expedience.
The Supremacy Clause does not distinguish between self executing and non self executing treaties in terms of their standing as supreme law. That distinction arises in the context of court enforceability not in determining whether the President must comply.
The historical and doctrinal evidence shows that treaties regardless of self execution status carry binding force on the executive. This is a necessary safeguard against unilateral disregard for international obligations. Adopting the Barr memo’s reasoning would set a precedent where the President could treat certain treaty commitments as optional whenever domestic litigation avenues are closed. That undermines both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and risks weakening US credibility in adhering to the rule based international order.
The deeper issue is whether the Office of Legal Counsel acts as a guardian of sound legal interpretation or as a facilitator of executive expedience.