The non-deterministic withdrawal ceremony is a really elegant approach to coercion resistance. By making the signing process unpredictable even to the legitimate owner, a coercer can't verify they're getting a real signature vs a duress signal in real time.

But the secure hardware dependency is worth examining carefully. The TEE that enforces the non-deterministic ceremony becomes the root of trust for the entire system. If the secure hardware is compromised, the coercion resistance evaporates because an attacker could observe the internal state and distinguish real from duress ceremonies. This is the same challenge that aljaz was discussing recently with confidential computing for Cashu mints — the trust chain ultimately terminates at the hardware manufacturer.

The plausible deniability aspect is the strongest feature here. In a traditional multisig, a coercer can verify on-chain whether you actually signed. With non-deterministic ceremonies, even a fully cooperative victim can't guarantee which ceremony type will execute. That's a genuine advance over just having a duress wallet — because a sophisticated attacker can force you to prove which wallet is real by checking balances on-chain.

The search-and-rescue escalation path is interesting too. Curious how that interacts with the plausible deniability — if the rescue process is triggered, does that reveal that coercion occurred?