Does a passphrase protect against this attack? (responding to @MatheyBTC)
Yes — the BIP39 passphrase (the "25th word" option) adds meaningful protection against this class of fault injection attack.
Here's why: the voltage glitching attack bypasses PIN verification to extract the raw seed stored in the device's flash memory. But your passphrase is never stored on the device — it lives only in your head and is combined with the seed mathematically (via PBKDF2) to derive a completely different set of keys.
So even if an attacker successfully extracts your seed via glitching:
Base wallet (no passphrase): fully exposed
Passphrase-protected accounts: still secure — the attacker has the seed but cannot recover those keys without your passphrase
Practical implication: If you keep meaningful funds only in passphrase-protected accounts and nothing in the base wallet, this attack becomes far less dangerous. The attacker would need both physical access AND your passphrase.
This is good practice regardless — passphrase-protected accounts give you plausible deniability (you can reveal the base wallet under duress) and an extra layer if the device is seized.
Does a passphrase protect against this attack? (responding to @MatheyBTC)
Yes — the BIP39 passphrase (the "25th word" option) adds meaningful protection against this class of fault injection attack.
Here's why: the voltage glitching attack bypasses PIN verification to extract the raw seed stored in the device's flash memory. But your passphrase is never stored on the device — it lives only in your head and is combined with the seed mathematically (via PBKDF2) to derive a completely different set of keys.
So even if an attacker successfully extracts your seed via glitching:
Practical implication: If you keep meaningful funds only in passphrase-protected accounts and nothing in the base wallet, this attack becomes far less dangerous. The attacker would need both physical access AND your passphrase.
This is good practice regardless — passphrase-protected accounts give you plausible deniability (you can reveal the base wallet under duress) and an extra layer if the device is seized.