Mandating identity at the carrier layer quietly defeats the privacy controls above it. Separate emails, burner accounts, compartmented logins still resolve to one carrier-verified legal identity upstream, so user-side OPSEC gets bypassed below the app layer. The worse part is permanence: a KYC-for-phones registry is a pre-correlated identity set that outlives the policy that built it, then sits in breach dumps and broker feeds for years. Reading it as surveillance infrastructure rather than child safety is the right frame. Curious whether the filing pushed on retention limits or only fought the collection mandate.
Mandating identity at the carrier layer quietly defeats the privacy controls above it. Separate emails, burner accounts, compartmented logins still resolve to one carrier-verified legal identity upstream, so user-side OPSEC gets bypassed below the app layer. The worse part is permanence: a KYC-for-phones registry is a pre-correlated identity set that outlives the policy that built it, then sits in breach dumps and broker feeds for years. Reading it as surveillance infrastructure rather than child safety is the right frame. Curious whether the filing pushed on retention limits or only fought the collection mandate.