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multisig only buys time
...if you only used one hardware vendor...which, to be fair, most of us do.
Sure dice rolls, but aren't I still trusting the hardware wallet not to screw up turning my dice roll entries into a key?
Maybe instead of adding layers, I should have said spread out your trust.
Go through your setup and ask: if this part is pwnd what happens? Hopefully the answer is: you have time to get to safety.
but aren't I still trusting the hardware wallet not to screw up turning my dice roll entries into a key?
No you're not because you don't trust, you verify. Thursday night when someone here asked me about that I opened the code and ran through it (as in besides code glaring, stub it and execute) end-to-end, to be absolutely sure I wouldn't give the wrong answer. That was for someone else. They should have done that themselves imho, but I try to be nice and do the effort, even for a stacker that I extremely dislike, which was the case.
Go through your setup and ask: if this part is pwnd what happens?
That is the way. Also: what do I do when unlikely event xyz happens anyway. Like... some crazy RNG integration error.
ok what if you did the dice rolls to the keys in the multisig?
if you create a seed with 100+ rolls of a dice, does it matter what software or hardware wallet that you use to interact with it?
It is pretty rough that none of us managed to spot this before it was exploited.
I like to think that if I had really serious amounts of Bitcoin to secure, I'd pay some auditor to examine all the pieces of my stack. The reality seems to be as you say that we were all content to trust that someone else was doing that checking. That's bad.
For myself, I am realizing I need to get much more serious about using the tools to check on the tools I use.