This is my analysis and research on the closure of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz in different periods of history from centuries ago to the present day, the importance of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the most complete and comprehensive explanation of this sensitive and vital point on the planet. Perhaps if I say that this article that I wrote in the past few days is one of the most complete and comprehensive articles in this field, you will feel like I am exaggerating my work, but if you are interested and read my text carefully to the end, you will realize that, as I said, the article is very complete and accurate, and taken from reliable and official sources. If you have written such articles before, you will understand how much effort and trouble went into doing this. I did this for a content producer and got the job order from him and after doing it and finishing the work, unfortunately when I was paid for this work, he disappointed and saddened me a lot and only paid me 20% of the set price, which is about $5, and said that if the video feedback he makes with this text is good in the future, he will give me the rest of my salary. Anyway, it doesn't matter and it's just a coincidence that happened. I just wanted to publish it here now that I wrote this text with such precision and high quality. Even if a few people are interested and read it and are satisfied with this article, it is more valuable to me than the salary that I could not receive from that person. All I ask of you is please, please, please just give your opinion in the form of a comment and support me. Thank you.

In March 2026, as the conflict escalated and Iran ultimately blocked the Strait of Strait of Hormuz, discussions regarding energy route risks, the future of oil prices, and disruptions to the world's vital lifelines reached a fever pitch. However, alongside Hormuz, another similar risk is frequently mentioned—a danger that, despite being thousands of kilometers away from Iranian soil, experts often analyze side by side with Hormuz. This threat, referred to as the "nightmare scenario" for the global economy, is the simultaneous closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
Unlike Hormuz, the closure of Bab-el-Mandeb is not unprecedented, and the world has experienced its practical execution in recent years; specifically, when the Houthis of Yemen—a non-state armed group lacking standard, advanced naval warships—managed to force the world's largest shipping conglomerates to abandon the Bab-el-Mandeb route. At that juncture, the United States entered into direct conflict with the Houthis. Assessing that heavy strikes could swiftly reopen the waterway, Washington spent over a billion dollars and struck more than 100 targets across Yemen. Nevertheless, Washington failed to reopen the strait. In the logic of chokepoint warfare, closing a narrow maritime passage is far easier for an actor commanding the coastal geography than reopening it is for an expeditionary superpower. Ultimately, the United States withdrew and negotiated a cease-fire with the Houthis through Omani mediation—a cease-fire that drew sharp criticism from Israel, as it did not apply to attacks against Israeli targets and exclusively exempted the U.S. military.
Now, amid the active conflict with Iran, the nightmare scenario for the international economy is that, for the first time in modern history, the world's two financial respiratory valves could be choked off simultaneously, both falling under the combined pressure of Iran and its Yemeni allies. Such an event would exert a crushing blow on both Europe and Asia. In Europe, the impacts of this blockade would directly undermine public welfare and elevate the retail prices of consumer goods. In Asia, it would destabilize energy markets, heavy manufacturing, and Eastern stock exchanges. Such a strategic posture bestows immense leverage upon any actor holding geographical dominance—a power stemming from a narrow blue ribbon known as "Bab-el-Mandeb" or the "Gate of Grief," which measures a mere 30 kilometers across at its narrowest point.
Yet, examining the dimensions of this waterway raises a more fundamental question: What is the genuine, historical connection between Iran and this distant geographical pivot? At first glance, it might appear that the bond between Iran and Yemen is merely the byproduct of a coincidental partnership with a Zaydi Shia group in recent decades. In reality, however, the narrative of Iran’s presence and influence in Yemen possesses roots far deeper and older than the existence of the Islamic Republic. This historical thread can be traced from antiquity and the Sasanian Empire all the way to the modern era under the second Pahlavi monarch—a historical signpost demonstrating how geography dictates the behavior of powers across centuries.
The Geography of the Strait and Its Impact Mechanism on the Global Economy
Wedged between the continents of Asia and Africa—precisely between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula—lies a narrow maritime corridor. To its south lie the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, while to its north stretch the Red Sea and ultimately the Mediterranean. Three nations oversee this region: Yemen on the Asian side, and Eritrea and Djibouti on the African side. The narrowest section of this bottleneck is even tighter than the Strait of Hormuz. Treacherous water currents, seasonal Indian Ocean monsoons, sudden squalls, and extensive coral reefs earned this passage its ancient moniker, "The Gate of Grief"—for it drew tears from ancient mariners, just as it now draws tears from global commerce.
The contemporary role of Bab-el-Mandeb differs sharply from its historical past. Ever since the construction and opening of the Suez Canal, the Red Sea became the shortest maritime highway linking Asia to Europe. Consequently, Bab-el-Mandeb took its place alongside the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca as one of the world's three vital, natural chokepoints for energy and trade. Roughly one-third of global container traffic, along with vast volumes of crude oil, grain, foodstuffs, industrial componentry, chemical fertilizers, and automobiles, transits through this corridor. Furthermore, approximately 15 to 18 percent of global internet traffic flows through the subsea fiber-optic cables resting on the bed of this strait.
If one visualizes the entire Red Sea as a long corridor, it features two entry doors: the northern door is the Suez Canal, an artificial construct managed by an established state (Egypt); the southern door, however, is the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, classified as international waters with no single owner. Nevertheless, any actor who controls the geography of Yemen holds the capacity to lock this door. Instability at this node instantly causes maritime insurance premiums to surge, and these trickle-down costs artificially inflate the final price of every consumer good in target markets.
The paramount strategic value of this strait enables the small nation of Djibouti to generate roughly 40 percent of its national revenue simply by leasing land to foreign militaries for naval and air bases. The United States built its sole permanent military installation in Africa at this exact location. China, Japan, and France have likewise established major outposts in Djibouti to preserve their naval presence and monitoring capabilities over this bottleneck.
Positioned right in the middle of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait lies Perim Island, which constricts the shipping lanes even further. Any supertanker or massive cargo vessel wishing to navigate this route is forced to travel along a predictable, fixed transit corridor for hours—a transit corridor easily targeted from the Yemeni coastline by a wide array of weaponry. In asymmetric naval warfare, the rules of engagement in narrow straits are inverted: in open oceans, dominance belongs to aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and guided-missile destroyers; in a narrow strait, however, a weaker actor utilizing low-cost weaponry and leveraging coastal geography can tie down and ground the world's formidable military powers.
Even so, a structural distinction exists between Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb. Hormuz is the gateway to the Persian Gulf, which functions as a closed sea; blocking Hormuz therefore smothers a specific, enclosed region. Bab-el-Mandeb, by contrast, is an international shortcut. Closing it does not merely deadlock a isolated region—it ties the entirety of global commerce into a knot, driving up the cost of living for populations across the globe.
Bab-el-Mandeb and Iran’s Energy Equation
The relationship between this strait and Iran's energy security is critical in both wartime and peacetime scenarios. Oil and gas produced along the rim of the Persian Gulf split into two main branches upon exiting the Strait of Hormuz: the eastern branch travels through the Strait of Malacca toward Asian markets (China, Japan, and South Korea), while the western branch sails through Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal bound for Europe.
Under normal conditions, Bab-el-Mandeb serves as the valve calibrating oil exports to Europe. In a wartime scenario where the Strait of Hormuz is closed, however, the equation transforms. Saudi Arabia, as the world's largest oil exporter, can bypass Hormuz by pumping crude through its East-West pipeline to its Red Sea ports, loading it onto tankers, and shipping it through Bab-el-Mandeb toward Asian buyers to maintain its core market supply. In such a scenario, if Bab-el-Mandeb is closed as well, Saudi Arabia's alternative lifeline is completely severed. In other words: On the day Hormuz is shut, Bab-el-Mandeb becomes the master control valve for Asia's oil supply.
It is precisely this geographical logic that explains why controlling or wielding influence over Bab-el-Mandeb has proved irresistible to any ruler in Iran, regardless of their ideology. Throughout history, three distinct eras stand out in which Iranian rulers asserted their power toward this bottleneck—three regimes that, on paper, share virtually no similarities:

• Ancient Iran: The Sasanian Empire at the zenith of its global reach.
• 20th-Century Iran: The Pahlavi state, a Western-aligned power with a treasury overflowing with petrodollars.
• Modern Iran: The Islamic Republic, operating under severe international economic sanctions.
  Era One: Khosrow Anushirvan and the Sasanian Intervention in Yemen
  In the sixth century AD, during the reign of Sasanian Emperor Khosrow I (Anushirvan), the known world was divided between two superpowers: the Sasanian Empire (stretching from the Euphrates to the Indus) and the Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire (spanning from Anatolia to Egypt and the Levant). Beside them stood the Kingdom of Aksum in modern-day Ethiopia and Eritrea—a regional power that, while not as grand as Persia or Rome, operated as a key Christian ally of Byzantium.
  During that era, trade between East (China and India as hubs for silk and spices) and West (Mediterranean markets) followed four primary routes:
• The Overland Silk Road: Passing from China through Central Asia to Rayy, Ctesiphon, and onward to the Levant and Constantinople (traversing the heart of Iran, with lucrative customs duties enriching the Sasanian treasury).
• The Persian Gulf Maritime Route: Goods shipped from India were unloaded at southern Iranian ports and transported via land caravans through Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean (infrastructure expanded by Ardashir I, generating vast revenues for Iranian merchants and the crown).
• The Incense Route (Arabian Overland): Cargo was brought from India to Yemeni ports, loaded onto camel caravans, and moved up through the Hijaz (passing Mecca) toward the Levant (constrained by limited transport capacity and terminating in Byzantine-controlled territory).
• The Red Sea Maritime Route: Cargo passed through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, sailing up to Byzantine-controlled Egyptian ports and moving through Alexandria to European markets.
  Unable to defeat the Sasanians militarily and weary of paying exorbitant tariffs to Iranian merchants and state officials, the Byzantine Empire sought to break Iran’s trade monopoly. The Byzantine scheme was straightforward: revitalize and fortify the Red Sea route. If Constantinople could secure complete control over Bab-el-Mandeb, Eastern trade could reach Europe directly, bypassing Sasanian territory entirely. This would bankrupt the Iranian treasury and cripple its military capacity.
  To execute this strategy, Byzantium gave a green light to its ally, the Aksumite Empire, to conquer the Asian shore of Bab-el-Mandeb (Yemen), placing both sides of the strait under the control of pro-Byzantine allies.
  At the time, Yemen was a fertile, prosperous realm with a thriving agricultural base, occupying this exact strategic node. The rulers of Yemen (the Himyarite Kingdom) had converted to Judaism to embrace monotheism without submitting to Byzantine Christianity. In 523 AD, Dhu Nuwas, the Jewish king of Himyar, launched a brutal campaign against the Christian community of Najran, digging trenches filled with fire to immolate believers (an event referenced in historical chronicles and the Quran as the "Companions of the Trench").
  News of this massacre reached Constantinople and Aksum. Backed by Byzantine logistics, the Aksumite king invaded Yemen, overthrew Dhu Nuwas, and annexed the territory. General Abrahah (later known for his elephant-led campaign toward Mecca) assumed governance of Yemen. Consequently, Yemen became an Aksumite vassal state, realizing Byzantium's ambition to dominate both shores of Bab-el-Mandeb and bypass Iranian trade networks.
  Recognizing the existential nature of this strategic threat, Khosrow Anushirvan made a decision that altered the course of history. Saif ibn Dhi Yazan, a Yemeni prince who had given up hope of gaining Byzantine help to restore his dynasty, sought refuge at the Sasanian court in Ctesiphon. To manage risk, Anushirvan chose not to dispatch the core Sasanian standing army across such vast distances. Instead, he deployed a fleet carrying a force of 800 soldiers—mostly condemned prisoners offered redemption—under the command of a Daylamite naval commander named Vahrez (Boeyh).
  Despite their small numbers, the Iranian force, joining hands with local Yemeni insurgents, defeated the Aksumite army at the Battle of Hadramaut. The Abyssinian ruler was slain, and Yemen fell within the Sasanian sphere of influence. For roughly 60 years—until the advent of Islam—the Sasanians maintained a dual administration in Yemen: a local monarch sat on the throne, while an Iranian military governor (marzban) managed security and military affairs. Through this campaign, Byzantine dominance over Bab-el-Mandeb was neutralized, and Iranian merchant fleets in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regained their strategic depth. Anushirvan seized Yemen because he understood that controlling Bab-el-Mandeb meant holding the key to trade between Asia and Europe.
  Era Two: Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and the Open-Ocean Doctrine
  Following the fall of the Sasanians and over the course of centuries, Iran maintained no active military presence in Yemen or Bab-el-Mandeb. In the 19th century, Great Britain seized Aden and Perim Island, securing the keys to the strait, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 elevated the passage to global significance. During the Yom Kippur War (1973), Egypt and South Yemen demonstrated how the southern lock of the Red Sea could be weaponized by blockading Bab-el-Mandeb to tankers bound for the Israeli port of Eilat.
  In the 1970s, Tehran turned its gaze toward Bab-el-Mandeb once more. During this period, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi sat at the apex of his economic and military strength. Fueled by skyrocketing oil revenues and empowered by the U.S. "Nixon Doctrine"—which sought to delegate regional security to local allies following the Vietnam War—Iran assumed the role of the region's gendarme.
  On the opposing side, South Yemen had emerged as the sole officially Marxist-Leninist state in the Arab world, aligning closely with the Soviet Union. When Iranian oil tankers were held up at the closed gates of Bab-el-Mandeb during the 1973 conflict, the Shah grew deeply alarmed. Tehran’s calculus was clear: if a left-wing or communist coalition could seal Bab-el-Mandeb, Iran’s primary export channels and economic engine—which relied heavily on Red Sea routes to reach European markets—would be held hostage at a 30-kilometer passage located 4,000 kilometers away.
  To counter this threat, the Shah deployed a multi-layered strategy:
• Supporting Yemeni Royalists: Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser, who backed the Yemeni republicans, the Shah supported the Zaydi royalist factions in North Yemen to secure a friendly government adjacent to the strait.
• Military Intervention in Dhofar (Oman): A left-wing insurgency in Oman’s Dhofar region, nurtured by South Yemen and the Soviet Union, was advancing toward the Strait of Hormuz. At Sultan Qaboos's request, the Shah dispatched the Iranian Imperial Armed Forces. Following a bitter campaign, Iranian troops suppressed the rebellion, preventing Soviet influence from bridging the gap between Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb.
• Establishing a Blue-Water Navy: The Shah launched his most ambitious military endeavor: transforming the Imperial Iranian Navy from a Persian Gulf coastal force into an oceanic power. Construction of the massive naval base at Chabhar—Iran's only major port outside the Strait of Hormuz—was initiated with this goal in mind. Orders were placed with the U.S. and Britain for advanced destroyers, submarines, and long-range maritime patrol aircraft to enable Iran to project power across the Indian Ocean and monitor the Bab-el-Mandeb theater.
  The 1979 Revolution cut short Iran's second push to anchor its influence across the Indian Ocean and Bab-el-Mandeb, yet the underlying strategic imperatives embedded in the geography remained unchanged.
  Era Three: The Islamic Republic and the Ansarallah Network
  Decades after the revolution, Iran’s focus returned to Bab-el-Mandeb, resulting in the most effective level of operational leverage over the chokepoint to date. This was achieved under starkly different circumstances: post-revolutionary Iran was neither a wealthy ancient empire nor a superpower-backed ally flush with petrodollars. Instead, it was a state navigating stringent international sanctions and severe financial and military constraints.
  Without relying on permanent naval bases or an oceanic fleet in the Red Sea, Tehran projected power over Bab-el-Mandeb through a local ally: the Ansarallah movement (Houthi movement) in Yemen. Originating as a Zaydi revivalist group in the 1990s, the Houthis expanded rapidly amid the turmoil of the 2011 Arab Spring. By 2014, they seized Sana'a, and by 2015, they advanced toward Yemen's western coastline overlooking Bab-el-Mandeb.
  Following the events of October 7, 2023, and the outbreak of hostilities in Gaza, the Houthis announced a blockade on all vessels associated with or destined for Israel attempting to transit Bab-el-Mandeb. In maritime strategy, physically closing a strait is never necessary to paralyze it; the credible threat of anti-ship missiles or drone strikes alone causes insurance underwriters to hike rates exponentially. Consequently, global shipping lines were forced to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope—a detour adding up to two weeks to voyages and driving global freight costs higher.
  By mid-2024, transit traffic through Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal dropped by more than two-thirds, slashing Egypt's Suez Canal revenues by over half. Despite forming multinational task forces and dropping hundreds of tons of munitions, the U.S. military failed to strip the Houthis of this leverage, ultimately concluding a cease-fire agreement with the group.
  Conclusion: Geography as Permanent Strategic Leverage
  Viewing these three distinct historical chapters from a macro perspective reveals that three entirely different Iranian regimes—the Sasanians, the Pahlavi monarchy, and the Islamic Republic—sharing no common ideology, political structure, or worldview, all moved to project power over Yemen and Bab-el-Mandeb.
  This consistent behavior across centuries stems from a single factor: the unyielding logic of geography.
  Ideologies, political systems, religions, and dynasties come and go, but geography remains constant. Geography serves simultaneously as a source of threat and vulnerability, and as a reservoir of opportunity and leverage. Yemen and Bab-el-Mandeb remain vital because, at a critical geopolitical junction, exerting influence over this passage can squeeze the windpipes of global commerce.
  However, the capacity to project power over such a chokepoint is merely an "instrument." The true value of this strategic asset is ultimately judged by how effectively it serves the core national goal: whether this geographical leverage ultimately translates into enhanced security, greater economic prosperity, tangible welfare, and elevated living standards for the people of Iran. Geographical levers remain immutable, but how regimes harness them to serve their populace is where the true test lies.

I wrote this text in Farsi due to my lack of proficiency in English, so I translated it with online services, for this reason I apologize for possible errors in the structure of the text and sentences.