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no one can lock your Bitcoin to a CTV script (using a seed phrase you created) in the same way that no one can lock your Bitcoin into a multi-sig with keys that they control. This is FUD.
Anything you can do with CTV you can already do with presigned transactions + deleted keys. The purpose of the CTV consensus change is to make it so users don't have to perform this bullshit ceremony just to use that functionality.
No because like one of the things they're trying to do is like coin pools. Like your lightning transaction is actually a 2-of-2 multi-sig. So its kinda like "just use deleted keys" and so you're relying on the other party you're in this covenant with (which just like multi-sig only works by exposing xpubs) to delete their keys in order for your security guarantees to be real.
Also lets be honest with ourselves, a psbt (or a bunch of them) is like going back to 2009 wallet.dat files for Bitcoin key backups.
I'm sorry I'm trying to make it relatable to something you've experienced before, but again, that's why I call for demonstration software.
Hey, recreate a vault that protects an mk3 generated seed using presigned transactions. See how well it goes for you.
So I thought about it right? You would generate the seed on the mk3, presign a transaction to a holding address. The holding address uses the timelock script. After the timelock, the mk3 can spend from the funds again, no no wait...because the key wasn't generated securely the presigned transaction never gets mined ah fuck and we don't have a "wait until I sign to start the timelock" op_code in Bitcoin script. Man, but Kruw you're so sure about this pre-signed transaction thing why don't you demonstrate for the class?
Look, if you know me, you know I like to hold back from being an asshole like this, but I don't know maybe this is what it takes to make a point?
I love being an asshole, no problem.
Hey, recreate a vault that protects an mk3 generated seed using presigned transactions. See how well it goes for you.
Irrelevant. Bitcoin is built on the assumption that users generate random secrets. Nothing matters if you discard this premise.
Okay. We'll see how relevant it is on the larger forum. I think its actually very relevant. "CTV vaults save you when your cold card fails you".
I think there's a bunch of node runners that are going to be very happy that this risk mitigation can be a possibility.
I think its actually very relevant. "CTV vaults save you when your cold card fails you".
It would be relevant if I made the claim that CTV would have stopped the COLDCARD attacker, but I didn't.
However, I will steelman that argument for you to fight it: The option of covenant enabled vaults could have mitigated some of the losses from the CC vulnerability. This is not because CTV protects coins directly, it is because users are more likely to use multisig/passphrase/dice rolls on their "final stand" vault wallet than they would for a daily spending wallet.
The logic makes sense, but not the story. Why is it needed?
Multusig mitigated single points of failure risks. Simple.
Simplicity speaks volumes.
Don't worry, I'm going to be taking the "code or shut up" approach for the next few months. I'll come back with a GUI so you can see what I'm talking about, although CLI demo software is currently available if you would like to get ahead of the curve.
Multi-sig can be defined as "Restricting a UTXO to only be spent after a number of wallets has signed" or timelocks as "Restricting a UTXO such that it can only be spent after time is passed"
You have to create a wallet with the CTV script for this to be a thing. As we only expose addresses, and not xpubs, no one can lock your Bitcoin to a CTV script (using a seed phrase you created) in the same way that no one can lock your Bitcoin into a multi-sig with keys that they control. This is FUD.
This is once again a demonstration of why I am calling for anyone serious about CTV to write demonstration software