Thanks, your input is much appreciated. Absolutely, domains remain a potential attack vector. That said, potential risks and attacks at the domain level are also significantly reduced when using a private as opposed to a centrally issued identifier. With the former, they only apply to one individual using an independent identifier/domain. With the latter, the same risks and attack vectors at the domain level apply to all users of the centrally issued identifiers but on top of that, all users are completely dependent on the issuer, which introduces further (and arguably more significant) risks. It also drastically increases potential attack vectors, as the incentive to attack a domain that so many individuals rely on is far greater compared to a domain owned by a single individual.

Using a self-hosted Nostr address does not eliminate risks or attack vectors entirely but it effectively brings it all the way down to just one fundamental component: a privately owned and controlled domain, which is relatively secure and censorship-resistant (very much so in certain jurisdictions). The vulnerabilities at the server level (i.e. hosting provider) remain intact but here too, they are far less meaningful than they are for a server that's used by multiple people and owned/controlled by a central actor. In the event of some server-impairing event, a person using a private server/hosting account can simply move their identifier files to another server and point their domain (nameservers) to that server. A person using a third-party server does not have that option and would see their Nostr identifier (as well as their Lightning forwarding address and other services) abruptly terminated, as they were trapped all along.