The legacy of chemical attacks

The chemical attack by Syrian government forces on Eastern Ghouta ten years ago garnered international attention and raised the very real possibility of a military intervention by the United States. A year earlier, US President Barack Obama had declared the use of chemical weapons by the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad a “red line”.

In the aftermath of the gruesome attack in which more than a thousand people are believed to have perished, Russian and American diplomats hurriedly negotiated an agreement for Syria to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention that would involve the destruction of its stockpiles under the auspices of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The US president stated at that time that the “opportunity to achieve our objectives through diplomacy” was preferable to military intervention but that the US remained “prepared to act” should Syria not comply.

Yet, Bashar al-Assad’s regime continued to use chemical weapons against the Syrian people frequently , facing no significant repercussions. By 2019, there had been 336 attacks, 98 percent of them committed by the authorities in Damascus and the rest by ISIL (ISIS), according to a report by the Berlin-based Global Public Policy Institute.

There was no longer any rationale for foreign intervention to prevent chemical weapons attacks once the Russian-US agreement on Syria’s nuclear weapons was reached as all parties could point to the OPCW monitoring as a sufficient prevention mechanism. Although the US launched airstrikes against Syrian military facilities in 2017 and 2018 in retaliation for chemical weapons use, they did not curb Syria’s chemical weapons capacity.

No one from the Syrian regime has been held accountable for the Eastern Ghouta attack or any of the other ones, despite the use of such arms constituting a war crime under international law. This reflects the absence of any sort of justice or accountability mechanisms that could move the country towards lasting peace and help avert the relapse into a major war.

One of the main reasons for this sad state of affairs is the failure of the peace process which could have ushered in a transitional justice process – as has happened in other countries that have been ravaged by civil wars.

The US and other Western powers, which initially backed the Syrian opposition’s rebellion against al-Assad, quickly lost interest in pursuing any sort of diplomatic solution to the conflict through the United Nations-led Geneva Process. The UN initiative was wholly supplanted by the “Astana Process”, which was convened by Syria’s allies Russia and Iran, along with Turkey, to manage the Syrian conflict. This forum largely provided a buffer against international intervention into “peace” efforts and shielded the regime from any externally imposed peace process.

The Russian intervention in September 2015 decisively shifted the situation on the ground in the regime’s favour. Successive large-scale offensives against opposition groups and four “de-escalation” deals guaranteed by Turkey, Russia and Iran, allowed Damascus to recapture a significant part of territories it had lost. Although the intensity of fighting has diminished, conflict has lingered on in the northwest and northeast of the country, with al-Assad’s regime continuously targeting the civilian population and infrastructure.

Despite this violent reality, Damascus has declared that the war is over and that refugees can begin to return home.

In an abrupt policy shift reflecting the regime’s continued hold on power and the desire to repatriate Syrians and resume trade ties, Arab states readmitted Syria into the Arab League. The normalisation of relations has paved the way for much-needed reconstruction funds to support recovery.