I know prediction markets are sometimes requested, i.e. posts whose content is "How much do you bet that X will happen?", but it's hard to implement because who's gonna moderate and decide if and when X happens.
These type of posts would enable a swarm intelligence that would provide great unique value to SN though.
So I suggest a modified "prediction market" that does the same thing, instead of betting on outcomes the betting is always on "what everyone else will pick", with outcome and rewards distributed when the "poll" ends.
What that would enable is a very interesting type of question: "What do you think fewest others will bet?". It forces swarm intelligence.
For instance, it's not so interesting to have a list of bitcoin and 5 shitcoins and ask "Which coin has greatest potential; Place your bet on which you think others will choose". Obviously everyone will pick bitcoin. But asking the XOR of the question, "Which coin will fewest people choose?". Talk about informational!
but it's hard to implement because who's gonna moderate and decide if and when X happens.
Yep, the Oracle problem. I am working on delphi.market, a prediction market on lightning. (Not much to see there at the moment.)
The idea is that this side project will be integrated into SN as a post type at some point. But probably still a long way to go since I first need to get it working without SN.
One of my ideas was that the site (therefore, me) would only act as the oracle in case the two parties which are locked into a trade don't agree on the outcome (like escrow basically). The hope is that if the outcomes are rather easy to verify, it wouldn't be hard for me to just say who is the winner in that case. Therefore, they wouldn't disagree in the first place probably.
Additionally, there could be a bond which both parties pay and they get it back if they find consensus or I pick them as the winner during a dispute.
Additionally, HODL invoices will be used to make sure that users either get their funds back within a set period of time or find a counter party and thus enter a trade (unrelated to the oracle problem but more an attempt to solve for liquidity).
So I suggest a modified "prediction market" that does the same thing, instead of betting on outcomes the betting is always on "what everyone else will pick", with outcome and rewards distributed when the "poll" ends.
So you mean it's not about events (to eliminate the oracle) but what people think most people think?
In that case, the information of existing picks must be hidden until the end since else, you could just see which option has the most (or least) votes already. But this would kill one nice property of prediction markets: to show real-time information.
Also, a prediction market includes selling shares, not only buying shares (=betting). This is also to better accommodate new information entering the market since people can sell shares of an outcome when the outcome suddenly becomes less likely. If you only allow betting, it couldn't reflect the new state as efficient.
So I wouldn't call this a prediction market imo
But asking the XOR of the question, "Which coin will fewest people choose?". Talk about informational!
Also, I think you are replacing one problem (oracle problem) with another problem (sybil resistance). You would need to KYC your users so they can't just create more votes out of thin air and create a lot of votes for every vote they didn't pick.
mhh, or maybe that would not be the case. since you're not voting, you're betting sats 🤔
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In that case, the information of existing picks must be hidden until the end since else, you could just see which option has the most (or least) votes already. But this would kill one nice property of prediction markets: to show real-time information.
Yes. I don't use them so they don't mean much to me. Is it such an interesting property?
Also, a prediction market includes selling shares, not only buying shares (=betting).
Make it binary. "I bet this will lose" / "I bet this will win" , no?
Also, I think you are replacing one problem (oracle problem) with another problem (sybil resistance). You would need to KYC your users so they can't just create more votes out of thin air and create a lot of votes for every vote they didn't pick.
So you mean, someone anonymous could (in the "which choice will be bet on least") buy more shares than anyone else and also shares in the artificial winner? That could be worked out fairly seems to me, using the power of maths
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1000 sats \ 5 replies \ @ek 14 Sep 2023
Yes. I don't use them so they don't mean much to me. Is it such an interesting property?
If you're trying to find out the probability of real events before they happen (hence predicting), yes. Since if the prediction market can't show you information until the event happened, it does not provide any useful information. Prediction markets are also sometimes called information markets.
Make it binary. "I bet this will lose" / "I bet this will win" , no?
But you should still be able to exit the market before the market runs out. So yes, you need "this will win" and "this will lose" (in both options you enter the market by betting some amount) but you also need "this will no longer win" and "this will no longer lose".
Else it's more like sports betting, not a prediction market.
Sorry if I'm being pedantic but this difference is important to me, haha
So you mean, someone anonymous could (in the "which choice will be bet on least") buy more shares than anyone else and also shares in the artificial winner?
Yeah, that was my initial idea but they would lose sats to win sats in that case. So no longer sure if that's a real problem in your idea.
However, you would need to pick a deadline since it's no event determined by external factors.
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It's awesome that you're working on this, it's definitely a hard problem to solve but one that would give great unique value to users. Feel free to bounce ideas with me, don't worry about being pedantic or anything I love it!
Yeah, how do you crowdsource prediction? How do you let users bet "this will win" while also allowing them to change their mind and bet the opposite? Especially, how do you do that with anonymous users (i.e. "sybil immunity").
I suppose I think about it in terms of the old puzzle with the two guards, one who always lies and one who always tells the truth. Your objective is to choose one of two doors (win/lose) and you get to ask one guard one question, not knowing which guard is lying. Then, the question you should ask is "What would the other guard say is the winning door?" and pick the opposite of whatever was responded.
So instead of somehow asking "Which door is the winner?", you ask "Which door do you think everyone else thinks is the winner?", in order to bypass liars entirely.
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t's awesome that you're working on this, it's definitely a hard problem to solve but one that would give great unique value to users. Feel free to bounce ideas with me, don't worry about being pedantic or anything I love it!
Haha, did I just find my first test subject ? 👀
The first release will be on a custom signet. So you'd have infinite sats to trade with.
So instead of somehow asking "Which door is the winner?", you ask "Which door do you think everyone else thinks is the winner?", in order to bypass liars entirely.
I see, I think you're also describing the game theory behind bitcoin mining.
Miners constantly ask themselves: On which chain does the majority mine?
This is what keeps them honest. If they pick the wrong chain which is equivalent to lying in your case, they lose sats.
In mining, the answer is: the chain with the most proof of work since that chain will outgrow any other chain.
Game theory is pretty cool
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Game theory is pretty cool
For sure one of my top 3 favorite theorys :D
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50 sats \ 1 reply \ @ek 16 Sep 2023
What are your other top 3 theories?
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Hahah i thought you'd never ask.. Definitely Evolution ("selfish" genes expressing traits which compete in reality => traits adapting to environments) and Relativity ("things" tell "space" how to curve; "space" tells "things" how to move)! What about you