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0 sats \ 18 replies \ @BitcoinHistory OP 14 Nov 2023 \ parent \ on: Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper | Satoshi Nakamoto satoshi at vistomail.com Fri Oct 31 bitcoin
Satoshi Nakamoto
https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2008-November/014832.html
satoshi at vistomail.com
Sat Nov 8 20:58:48 EST 2008
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Hal Finney wrote:
Right, nodes keep transactions in their working set until they get into a block. If a transaction reaches 90% of nodes, then each time a new block is found, it has a 90% chance of being in it.
That does not need to be checked for. The transaction in whichever branch ends up getting ahead becomes the valid one, the other is invalid. If someone tries to double spend like that, one and only one spend will always become valid, the others invalid.
Receivers of transactions will normally need to hold transactions for perhaps an hour or more to allow time for this kind of possibility to be resolved. They can still re-spend the coins immediately, but they should wait before taking an action such as shipping goods.
The attacker isn't adding blocks to the end. He has to go back and redo the block his transaction is in and all the blocks after it, as well as any new blocks the network keeps adding to the end while he's doing that. He's rewriting history. Once his branch is longer, it becomes the new valid one.
This touches on a key point. Even though everyone present may see the shenanigans going on, there's no way to take advantage of that fact.
It is strictly necessary that the longest chain is always considered the valid one. Nodes that were present may remember that one branch was there first and got replaced by another, but there would be no way for them to convince those who were not present of this. We can't have subfactions of nodes that cling to one branch that they think was first, others that saw another branch first, and others that joined later and never saw what happened. The CPU power proof-of-work vote must have the final say. The only way for everyone to stay on the same page is to believe that the longest chain is always the valid one, no matter what.
The recipient just needs to verify it back to a depth that is sufficiently far back in the block chain, which will often only require a depth of 2 transactions. All transactions before that can be discarded.
Right, exactly. When a node receives a block, it checks the signatures of every transaction in it against previous transactions in blocks. Blocks can only contain transactions that depend on valid transactions in previous blocks or the same block. Transaction C could depend on transaction B in the same block and B depends on transaction A in an earlier block.
I appreciate your questions. I actually did this kind of backwards. I had to write all the code before I could convince myself that I could solve every problem, then I wrote the paper. I think I will be able to release the code sooner than I could write a detailed spec. You're already right about most of your assumptions where you filled in the blanks.
Satoshi Nakamoto
Satoshi Nakamoto
https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2008-November/014833.html
satoshi at vistomail.com
Sat Nov 8 22:09:49 EST 2008
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James A. Donald wrote:
The core concept is that lots of entities keep complete and consistent information as to who owns which bitcoins.But maintaining consistency is tricky. It is not clear to me what happens when someone reports one transaction to one maintainer, and someone else transports another transaction to another maintainer. The transaction cannot be known to be valid until it has been incorporated into a globally shared view of all past transactions, and no one can know that a globally shared view of all past transactions is globally shared until after some time has passed, and after many new transactions have arrived.Did you explain how to do this, and it just passed over my head, or were you confident it could be done, and a bit vague as to the details?
The proof-of-work chain is the solution to the synchronisation problem, and to knowing what the globally shared view is without having to trust anyone.
A transaction will quickly propagate throughout the network, so if two versions of the same transaction were reported at close to the same time, the one with the head start would have a big advantage in reaching many more nodes first. Nodes will only accept the first one they see, refusing the second one to arrive, so the earlier transaction would have many more nodes working on incorporating it into the next proof-of-work. In effect, each node votes for its viewpoint of which transaction it saw first by including it in its proof-of-work effort.
If the transactions did come at exactly the same time and there was an even split, it's a toss up based on which gets into a proof-of-work first, and that decides which is valid.
When a node finds a proof-of-work, the new block is propagated throughout the network and everyone adds it to the chain and starts working on the next block after it. Any nodes that had the other transaction will stop trying to include it in a block, since it's now invalid according to the accepted chain.
The proof-of-work chain is itself self-evident proof that it came from the globally shared view. Only the majority of the network together has enough CPU power to generate such a difficult chain of proof-of-work. Any user, upon receiving the proof-of-work chain, can see what the majority of the network has approved. Once a transaction is hashed into a link that's a few links back in the chain, it is firmly etched into the global history.
Satoshi Nakamoto
NOTE: This reply by satoshi quote an email that may have been rpivatly sent to Satoshi by James, since this source email by James is no where to be found on the cryptography mailing list. We assume this reply by James is in reply to Satoshi's reply to Hal, since it fits the conversation flow being had at the time very closely, and more than to any other conversation tangent at the time. This reply also comes right after the hal finney reply, so its very likely in the correct order as seen here on stacker.news.
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James A. Donald
https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2008-November/014835.html
jamesd at echeque.com
Sun Nov 9 03:56:53 EST 2008
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Satoshi Nakamoto wrote:
The proof-of-work chain is the solution to the synchronisation problem, and to knowing what the globally shared view is without having to trust anyone.A transaction will quickly propagate throughout the network, so if two versions of the same transaction were reported at close to the same time, the one with the head start would have a big advantage in reaching many more nodes first. Nodes will only accept the first one they see, refusing the second one to arrive, so the earlier transaction would have many more nodes working on incorporating it into the next proof-of-work. In effect, each node votes for its viewpoint of which transaction it saw first by including it in its proof-of-work effort.
OK, suppose one node incorporates a bunch of
transactions in its proof of work, all of them honest
legitimate single spends and another node incorporates a
slightly different bunch of transactions in its proof of
work, all of them equally honest legitimate single
spends, and both proofs are generated at about the same
time.
What happens then?
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Satoshi Nakamoto
https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2008-November/014838.html
satoshi at vistomail.com
Sun Nov 9 11:31:26 EST 2008
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James A. Donald wrote:
OK, suppose one node incorporates a bunch of transactions in its proof of work, all of them honest legitimate single spends and another node incorporates a different bunch of transactions in its proof of work, all of them equally honest legitimate single spends, and both proofs are generated at about the same time.What happens then?
They both broadcast their blocks. All nodes receive them and keep both, but only work on the one they received first. We'll suppose exactly half received one first, half the other.
In a short time, all the transactions will finish propagating so that everyone has the full set. The nodes working on each side will be trying to add the transactions that are missing from their side. When the next proof-of-work is found, whichever previous block that node was working on, that branch becomes longer and the tie is broken. Whichever side it is, the new block will contain the other half of the transactions, so in either case, the branch will contain all transactions. Even in the unlikely event that a split happened twice in a row, both sides of the second split would contain the full set of transactions anyway.
It's not a problem if transactions have to wait one or a few extra cycles to get into a block.
Satoshi Nakamoto
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James A. Donald
https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2008-November/014841.html
jamesd at echeque.com
Sun Nov 9 14:57:54 EST 2008
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James A. Donald wrote:OK, suppose one node incorporates a bunch of transactions in its proof of work, all of them honest legitimate single spends and another node incorporates a different bunch of transactions in its proof of work, all of them equally honest legitimate single spends, and both proofs are generated at about the same time.What happens then?
Satoshi Nakamoto wrote:
They both broadcast their blocks. All nodes receive them and keep both, but only work on the one they received first. We'll suppose exactly half received one first, half the other.In a short time, all the transactions will finish propagating so that everyone has the full set. The nodes working on each side will be trying to add the transactions that are missing from their side. When the next proof-of-work is found, whichever previous block that node was working on, that branch becomes longer and the tie is broken. Whichever side it is, the new block will contain the other half of the transactions, so in either case, the branch will contain all transactions. Even in the unlikely event that a split happened twice in a row, both sides of the second split would contain the full set of transactions anyway.It's not a problem if transactions have to wait one or a few extra cycles to get into a block.
So what happened to the coin that lost the race?
On the one hand, we want people who make coins to be
motivated to keep and record all transactions, and
obtain an up to date record of all transactions in a
timely manner. On the other hand, it is a bit harsh if
the guy who came second is likely to lose his coin.
Further, your description of events implies restrictions
on timing and coin generation - that the entire network
generates coins slowly compared to the time required for
news of a new coin to flood the network, otherwise the
chains diverge more and more, and no one ever knows
which chain is the winner.
You need to make these restrictions explicit, for
network flood time may well be quite slow.
Which implies that the new coin rate is slower.
We want spenders to have certainty that their
transaction is valid at the time it takes a spend to
flood the network, not at the time it takes for branch
races to be resolved.
At any given time, for example at 1 040 689 138 seconds
we can look back at the past and say:
At 1 040 688 737 seconds, node 5 was *it*, and he incorporated all the coins he had discovered into the chain, and all the new transactions he knew about on top of the previous link At 1 040 688 792 seconds, node 2 was *it*, and he incorporated all the coins he had discovered into the chain, and all the new transactions he knew about into the chain on top of node 5's link. At 1 040 688 745 seconds, node 7 was *it*, and he incorporated all the coins he had discovered into the chain, and all the new transactions he knew about into the chain on top of node 2's link.
But no one can know who is it right now
So how does one know when to reveal one's coins? One
solution is that one does not. One incorporates a hash
of the coin secret whenever one thinks one might be
it, and after that hash is securely in the chain,
after one knows that one was it at the time, one can
then safely spend the coin that one has found, revealing
the secret.
This solution takes care of the coin revelation problem,
but does not solve the spend recording problem. If one
node is ignoring all spends that it does not care about,
it suffers no adverse consequences. We need a protocol
in which your prospects of becoming it also depend on
being seen by other nodes as having a reasonably up to
date and complete list of spends - which this protocol
is not, and your protocol is not either.
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Satoshi Nakamoto
https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2008-November/014843.html
satoshi at vistomail.com
Mon Nov 10 17:18:20 EST 2008
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James A. Donald wrote:
So what happened to the coin that lost the race?... it is a bit harsh if the guy who came second is likely to lose his coin.
When there are multiple double-spent versions of the same transaction, one and only one will become valid.
The receiver of a payment must wait an hour or so before believing that it's valid. The network will resolve any possible double-spend races by then.
The guy who received the double-spend that became invalid never thought he had it in the first place. His software would have shown the transaction go from "unconfirmed" to "invalid". If necessary, the UI can be made to hide transactions until they're sufficiently deep in the block chain.
Further, your description of events implies restrictions on timing and coin generation - that the entire network generates coins slowly compared to the time required for news of a new coin to flood the network
Sorry if I didn't make that clear. The target time between blocks will probably be 10 minutes.
Every block includes its creation time. If the time is off by more than 36 hours, other nodes won't work on it. If the timespan over the last 62430 blocks is less than 15 days, blocks are being generated too fast and the proof-of-work difficulty doubles. Everyone does the same calculation with the same chain data, so they all get the same result at the same link in the chain.
We want spenders to have certainty that their transaction is valid at the time it takes a spend to flood the network, not at the time it takes for branch races to be resolved.
Instantant non-repudiability is not a feature, but it's still much faster than existing systems. Paper cheques can bounce up to a week or two later. Credit card transactions can be contested up to 60 to 180 days later. Bitcoin transactions can be sufficiently irreversible in an hour or two.
If one node is ignoring all spends that it does not care about, it suffers no adverse consequences.
With the transaction fee based incentive system I recently posted, nodes would have an incentive to include all the paying transactions they receive.
Satoshi Nakamoto
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James A. Donald
https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2008-November/014847.html
jamesd at echeque.com
Thu Nov 13 01:16:31 EST 2008
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Satoshi Nakamoto wrote:
When there are multiple double-spent versions of the same transaction, one and only one will become valid.
That is not the question I am asking.
It is not trust that worries me, it is how it is
possible to have a a globally shared view even if
everyone is well behaved.
The process for arriving at a globally shared view of
who owns what bitgold coins is insufficiently specified.
Once specified, then we can start considering whether
everyone has incentives to behave correctly.
It is not sufficient that everyone knows X. We also
need everyone to know that everyone knows X, and that
everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows X
- which, as in the Byzantine Generals problem, is the classic hard problem of distributed data processing.
This problem becomes harder when X is quite possibly a
very large amount of data - agreement on who was the
owner of every bitgold coin at such and such a time.
And then on top of that we need everyone to have a
motive to behave in such a fashion that agreement
arises. I cannot see that they have motive when I do
not know the behavior to be motivated.
You keep repeating your analysis of the system under
attack. We cannot say how the system will behave under
attack until we know how the system is supposed to
behave when not under attack.
If there are a lot of transactions, it is hard to
efficiently discover the discrepancies between one
node's view and another node's view, and because new
transactions are always arriving, no two nodes will ever
have the same view, even if all nodes are honest, and
all reported transactions are correct and true single
spends.
We should be able to accomplish a system where two nodes
are likely to come to agreement as to who owned what
bitgold coins at some very recent past time, but it is
not simple to do so.
If one node constructs a hash that represents its
knowledge of who owned what bitgold coins at a
particular time, and another node wants to check that
hash, it is not simple to do it in such a way that
agreement is likely, and disagreement between honest
well behaved nodes is efficiently detected and
efficiently resolved.
And if we had a specification of how agreement is
generated, it is not obvious why the second node has
incentive to check that hash.
The system has to work in such a way that nodes can
easily and cheaply change their opinion about recent
transactions, so as to reach consensus, but in order to
provide finality and irreversibility, once consensus has
been reached, and then new stuff has be piled on top of
old consensus, in particular new bitgold has been piled
on top of old consensus, it then becomes extremely
difficult to go back and change what was decided.
Saying that is how it works, does not give us a method
to make it work that way.
The receiver of a payment must wait an hour or so before believing that it's valid. The network will resolve any possible double-spend races by then.
You keep discussing attacks. I find it hard to think
about response to attack when it is not clear to me what
normal behavior is in the case of good conduct by each
and every party.
Distributed databases are hard even when all the
databases perfectly follow the will of a single owner.
Messages get lost, links drop, syncrhonization delays
become abnormal, and entire machines go up in flames,
and the network as a whole has to take all this in its
stride.
Figuring out how to do this is hard, even in the
complete absence of attacks. Then when we have figured
out how to handle all this, then come attacks.