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21 sats \ 5 replies \ @garyKrause_ 30 Nov 2023 \ parent \ on: Frostsnap multisigs will be epic! 🚀👀🐛 bitcoin
Shitty response. Do better.
"Frostsnap devices are not yet available for purchase", seems like it's proprietary hardware. 🚩- It's not air gapped. 🚩
- You are generating keys on a internet connected device. 🚩
- What will happen if you lose one of those devices? RIP your coins. 🚩
- Why waste your sats on this when you can just write the keys down on a piece of paper? 🚩
The picture says it all. You just had to think.
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"Frostsnap devices are not yet available for purchase", seems like it's proprietary hardware. 🚩
AFAIK it's open-source: https://github.com/frostsnap/frostsnap/
It's not air gapped. 🚩 You are generating keys on a internet connected device. 🚩
These 2 points are the same thing, and I can't tell from the what the frostsnap team has put out if this is the case. Based on the pic I assume the PCB boards are where the keys are kept? therefore it is "air gapped".
What will happen if you lose one of those devices? RIP your coins. 🚩
It talks on this page about being able to backup your signers. It also mentions that you can replace a signer if 1 is compromised, I assume that works if one is lost as well.
Why waste your sats on this when you can just write the keys down on a piece of paper? 🚩
Here is my I'm bullish on frostsnap:
- You can replace a signer in a "multisig" wallet without generation new public keys. This is huge.
- The frostsnap page above says you don't need to keep metadata backups like you do with a current multisig where you have to backup the descriptor. This isn't as big of a deal because IMO you can just store the descriptor in a password manager, but it isn't nothing.
frostsnap is def new and time will tell how it all works but so far it looks like a great start.
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AFAIK it's open-source: https://github.com/frostsnap/frostsnap/
The code is. What about the hardware? I think in the first version they were using Rasberry Pis (you can see their old posts), but the most recent picture seems like a proprietary device.Based on the pic I assume the PCB boards are where the keys are kept? therefore it is "air gapped".
I see them connected to the phone via USB. Not "air gapped" in my book. But you are free to trust them.You can replace a signer in a "multisig" wallet without generation new public keys. This is huge.
Seems like a huge red flag to me. Can't this be abused? Maybe i'm wrong. Personally i don't need any of this nor i would recommend anyone to use. But it's an interesting project i will give them that.reply
The code is. What about the hardware? I think in the first version they were using Rasberry Pis (you can see their old posts), but the most recent picture seems like a proprietary device.
From the GitHub README (aka in plain site)
"device/ - The firmware which runs on ESP-32 microprocessors, handling message IO, user interaction, and display."
I see them connected to the phone via USB. Not "air gapped" in my book. But you are free to trust them.
Using devices does not mean they're connected to the internet. FROST requires communication between signers, plugging devices together simplifies this communication.
Seems like a huge red flag to me. Can't this be abused? Maybe i'm wrong. Personally i don't need any of this nor i would recommend anyone to use. But it's an interesting project i will give them that.
Study FROST some more. Stephan Livera does a great episode on it.
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seems like it's proprietary hardware
Our signature multisig setup involves daisy-chained devices for a fantastic user experience during key generation.
This dual usb-c port daisy-chaining requires custom hardware.
You can flash onto off-the-shelf esp-32 if you so desire.
It's not air gapped.
Airgapping is overrated, a good overview here:
https://bitbox.swiss/blog/does-airgap-make-bitcoin-hardware-wallets-more-secure/
Think about how interactive keygen can verifiably includes randomness from multiple devices:
- You don't need to trust that your device generates secure randomness
- You don't need to trust that your device uses that randomness
- You don't need to trust that your devices display addresses derived from that randomness
frostsnap achieves these with a simple UX.
What will happen if you lose one of those devices? RIP your coins.
Not even close, it's a
t-of-n threshold multisig.
If you create a 3-of-5 you can lose up to two devices.Each device has a backup.
So even if you lose one, just restore it from your backup.
Why waste your sats on this when you can just write the keys down on a piece of paper?
I'd love to hear your trustless setup that non-technical people can carry out securely.
(frostsnap is it)
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