Crowdsourced dispute resolution can be effective to resolve a limited set of dispute types, even without direct financial incentive schemes, when the decision-makers and disputants are part of a community with shared norms, customs, and goals.

For example, the eBay india community court, which adjudicated negative reviews, never compensated sellers and buyers who served as jurors, yet always had a steady stream of willing participants. The designers of that system attributed this to ebay's active community and extremely engaged users. Those sellers serving as jurors knew they could find themselves facing unwarranted negative feedback in the future, and would need a robust system to resolve the dispute. They were incentivized to help their community, because it would help them, too. Incentives were aligned, although not in a directly financial way.

Similarly on resolvr.io, users will predominantly be other bounty makers and bounty takers, who may end up in a dispute over a bounty at some point. Building and maintaining a robust jury system benefits these users, although not in a direct and immediately financial way.

There may be some optimal mount of sats required to vote in a poll that deters sybil attacks and spam but is not so costly as to disincentivize participation. That amount may scale with the size of the bounty and is something we are exploring!