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0 sats \ 2 replies \ @fiatjaf 12 Dec 2023 \ parent \ on: How To Get Robbed 4 BTC And Be Ignored by Anycoin.cz and BTCPay team bitcoin
I didn't think about the details, but it could be a simple thing based on Nostr.
You would make a list of other wallet providers you trust and listen to some specific Nostr relays for a specific kind.
Whenever there was some suspicious activity in any wallet provider they would publish payment hashes of transactions made by the suspicious people. You would then check your internal database for those hashes and temporarily freeze the involved accounts immediately, then try to hash it out with the other providers manually and understand the situation.
This is an interesting idea, but it could quickly be adapted into a kind of industry best practice in the same way that many exchanges are using Chainalysis to screen incoming onchain transactions.
Lets say this gets built and Chainalysis offers up a free service that you can point to in order to freeze lightning payments on a best effort based on payment hashes of transactions made by suspecious people. Now every regulated wallet provider or exchange would be pressured into using such a service.
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There is a pattern on most of these hacks. Hackers move the funds from one wallet (node) to another just to hide their trace. Hard to follow the money. Probably the easiest way to reduce these hacks is a temporary hold of the funds for a certain period of time. For example, if a wallet / account receives 1M Sats in a transaction, you would only allow out max 20% of this amount in the next 24 hours. If in 24 hours you receive information from other wallets concerning suspicious transactions, you can still return 80% of the funds.
Yes, I know, it can be a inconvenience for legitimate wallets / accounts, but for safety reasons it could be acceptable.
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