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10 sats \ 1 reply \ @petertodd 26 Mar \ parent \ on: Hedgehog: A protocol for asynchronous layer two bitcoin payments bitcoin
First of all, you were talking about "a majority of miners being honest". Even dishonest miners can't censor by themselves: they need coordination. You're mixing up "majority honest" with 51% attacks.
Second, the defense in this scenario is transaction fees and inflation subsidy: you're paying miners both immediately and an expected return in the future for mining transactions the way we all want them too be mined. That is an example of economic incentives. Not honesty.
Keep in mind that in academic protocol literature, the term "honest" is used to mean someone who rigorously follows a set protocol. Most Bitcoin hash power does not even begin to do that, as they differ from Core in lots of ways.
You're mixing up "majority honest" with 51% attacks
I didn't know there was a difference. If miners perform a 51% attack in order to prevent a transaction from being included in the longest chain, that seems like an example of a dishonest majority
That is an example of economic incentives. Not honesty.
It is an example of an economic incentive, but it does not seem to negate the presence of honesty. Miners who are dishonest (i.e. they want to censor you) can leave aside the economic incentive of fees+subsidy and censor you anyway
in academic protocol literature, the term "honest" is used to mean someone who rigorously follows a set protocol
I don't think I am using the term in an academically rigorous way. By "honest miners" I mean "miners who accept your transaction into their blocks or build on blocks that do." By "dishonest miners" I mean "miners who reject your transaction from their blocks and orphan blocks that include it."