Right on, yeah I think many of these are very valid. I wouldn't have thought people cared about black listing nodes but someone else I know suggested closing channels with nodes that show up as balance sharing node in their list. Unfortunately from what I can tell they have an option of balance sharing privately with just Amboss so you may not know that your channel partner is doing this.

If all else fails, and I don't use that term lightly, I think attacking these nodes are a very valid response to this.

These are some mitigations and the blacklisting especially does hurt the network. What we need is to change the approach: Don't make data sharing the norm because probing is already possible. Rather make probing more difficult, expensive and inconclusive.

Improve payment reliability by implementing Pickhardt-payments and share known good hops in Blinded Paths.

• Wall of Shame website for data sharing nodes (where publicyl visible) now
• lobby for the much more previcy preserving 2-bits approach proposed by Rene Pickardt

Apart from that, make script/plugin for nodes to report intentionally false data -essentially spam Amboss- has the best short-term cost-benefit ratio. Granted, we must assume that the big regulated nodes will virtue signal and openly communicate to not report false data, but the moment a payment takes two hops through non-datasharing nodes, then there is enough reasonable doubt

• compromise: attempt to provide most of the same convenience with much less balance data (I think rene proposed 2 bits)

• ddos balance sharing nodes

• Activate BIP 300, give up on lightning privacy, and use zside

• Move more transactions into chaumian ledgers