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what happens if you have a somewhat complex setup, and you just don't remember the details? Or seed phrase with a passphrase attached, and you know you'll always remember the passphrase, and then...you don't.
Probably the most important one and I didn't even list it. Yes.
But mostly I want to talk about the hardware wallet arguments here.
That's why I listed the threat model questions. The argument about HW wallet depends on what you think might happen. Busted secure element? NVK selling your shipping info to the CIA?
Vs Seed Signer -- having a piece of paper where, to simply look at the paper for one second compromises your entire stash, seems like a tradeoff I don't want personally.
Regarding the Seed Signer...even if you have some other signing device (regular hardware wallet like ColdCard, Ledger, etc), you'll always have a seed phrase backup, right?
And the backup would be stored/hidden in whatever way you think is best for your situation. So, I don't see that backing up a Seed Signer seed phrase is necessarily any different from backing up a ColdCard seed phrase. Am I missing something?
I do agree that, especially as bitcoin becomes more valuable and people start understanding what it is, having a list of 12 words anywhere that's remotely available/visible is a horrible idea. Obfuscating them somehow seems critical.
Here's a like with a list of potential concerns/considerations for using SeedSigner: https://github.com/SeedSigner/independent_custody_guide?tab=readme-ov-file#alright-but-theres-got-to-be-a-catch-right
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