The problem? Nordhaus’s own data didn’t find any evidence of cycles in Canada or Japan (see above). But, in the fog of time over the past half century, as scholars (so many always missing the forest in their obsession over a tiny sliver of tree bark) discussed his work and got caught up in a manic frenzy over expectations-augmented Phillips curves, iso-vote curves, infinite implicit rates of time preference, and arguments over whether rational expectations sunk political business cycles, they missed that his study—far from being a warning about the self-serving behavior of the political class—was really an argument for French or Swedish-style planning. Had the US gone this route, unquestionably it would be in much worse shape today.

What happened to Nordhaus over the last half century? He had one other major problem after the dust cleared in the wake of the collapse of the Phillips curve. Even appearing to insinuate that politicians and civil servants were not the selfless angels of highest moral probity of progressive religious dogma was not exactly a congenial idea at the cocktail parties and high conclaves of Yale and New Haven. For permanent prestige and fame, he needed a much more palatable Second Act, and struck gold by fathering climate-change economics and riding the new discipline to a Nobel prize in 2018. Despite briefly revisiting the topic in 1989 (“Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle”), memories of possible thoughtcrime committed in the mid-1970s faded considerably. It was as well-played as an exquisitely timed political business cycle.