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57 sats \ 5 replies \ @jonatack OP 25 Nov 2022 \ parent \ on: Jon Atack AMA bitcoin
I haven't looked at them yet. Generally, I look at a BIP in detail when reviewing a pull request to implement it in Bitcoin Core. Often, the spec ends up being updated or adjusted to the final form of the implementation, in a bottom-up fashion.
It’s the most promising BIP I’ve seen.
It could increase fees without out pricing normal transactions, eliminate all alt coins and allow unlimited permission less innovation with bitcoin as a anchor and currency. I would recommend taking a quick look at https://www.drivechain.info/. Tanks for the reply
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I think it creates really weird political issues between miners and sidechain users. I’d much rather we spend energy moving towards trustless zkrollups
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Lightcoin (roll up researcher) tweeted smth about using roll ups to secure drive chains. A combination of those could convince the last critic, I hope.
Btw, he does not believe that stealing funds, if this is what you imply, is a likely outcome (https://lightco.in/2021/06/21/miners-can-steal/).
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Miners stealing funds is a separate issue.
What I’m referring to is how miners know which drivechain withdrawals to advance and (to a lesser extent) which drivechains get activated.
In order for users to withdraw funds from a drivechain (not talking about an atomic swap here, talking about the hashrate escrow mechanism), miners have to “advance” a withdrawal transaction for ~6 months. How do miners know which withdrawal transaction to advamce if theyre not validating blocks on the sidechain? Note that its VERY central to the drivechain design that miners do NOT validate these blocks. So if there are two competing withdrawals for the same sidechain? Which one gets processed? How does a miner pick which one to advance?
The answer is politics: someone TELLs the miner “pick mine”. Or rather “pick mine or else” where “or else” bottoms out at “I’ll organize a UASF to nuke all drivechains”.
So that means that whenever there is beef happening in a sidechain community, the way to resolve it is for the competing factions of that sidechain to lobby or bully bitcoin miners to advance THEIR side.
There are (according to the spec for deivechains) up to 256 sidechains (i also dont think this is the right number, but thats another issue). So imagine that there are 256 sidechain projects and anytime any of them have internal politics or a contentious rule change, it spills out into twitter mobs trying to exert pressure on mainchain miners. Is that really a dynamic that we want?
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Interesting, thank you.
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