Nominalist ideas influenced the scientific revolution, shaping its departure from metaphysics, its mechanistic perspective, and the mathematization of all sciences. For example, Hobbes was a committed nominalist, asserting that “there is nothing in the world universal but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.” His idea of the contract did not stem from negotiation but rather resembled a “model like those of physics—a model in which, as a remnant of the energeia of the old physis, men were capable of moving on their own, but without direction, chaotically; thus, in the imaginary state of nature, they live overwhelmed by the fear of death,” according to Dalmacio Negro.

Newton—a contemporary of Hobbes during the early days of the Royal Society—viewed the universe as a clock requiring periodic rewinding. Not directly a nominalist, this was not merely metaphorical; he believed the mechanization of nature served as its model and paradigm. For example, Newton’s ideas were used to describe biological organisms as clocks, explaining processes such as blood circulation as mechanical. These organisms, like clocks, could also be rewound. Newton argued that, to maintain the universe, God had to periodically reverse historical effects, restoring balance between gravitational and inertial forces.

Then, according to Amos Funkenstein, the nominalist-based ideals in science include: homogenization: the idea that laws must explain all phenomena, both natural and social; mechanization: the belief that all nature can be explained in physical-mechanical terms; unequivocation: the notion that all names are arbitrary, implying that language can be altered; and mathematization: the assertion that the constructive mathematical language is the best framework for explaining social phenomena.

These ideals are closely related to the concept of static efficiency, which continues to dominate economic textbooks. First, the greatest error in economics is homogenization—attempting to apply the same methods used in natural sciences to social sciences, which are based on human action. The appropriate method for studying human action is logical-deductive reasoning, as Rothbard explained. This error can be observed in economists like Samuelson, who overuse physical science terminology in their writings. For example, Samuelson’s “correspondence principle” suggests that dynamic stability analysis in a neoclassical context could provide structure to the comparative statics of neoclassical price theory (although, to be fair, he rejected connections between physics and economics when he received the Nobel Prize). This terminology opens the door to later physical interpretations such as Noether’s theorem, chaos theory, or catastrophe theory.

Second, neoclassical economics is essentially a replica of mechanical physics, neglecting the concept of entrepreneurial creativity, as Huerta de Soto explained. This position fundamentally stems from a rejection of metaphysics and the existence of universals. Examples include Jevons, who invented a black box that magically performed all dynamic coordination functions without specifying how, or Walras, who referred to the “physical-mathematical science” of economics, defending the application of mathematics against skeptical physicists by asserting that utility was not a measurable quantum.

Third, the belief that universals do not exist, and that language can be modified directly contradicts the logical-deductive method in science and its conclusions, favoring empiricism. This empiricism introduces value judgments into dynamic efficiency criteria, contrary to scientific objectivity. Friedman, for example, argued that an economic theory’s usefulness should not be judged by its tautological completeness, regardless of its importance for providing a consistent system for classifying theoretical elements and deriving valid implications.

Fourth, it is concluded that the unequivocal language required for any science is mathematics. This promotes a mathematical-econometric approach in which perfect competition is used to derive functions that minimize inefficiencies, ignoring entrepreneurial creativity and coordination. As Mirowski explained, Pareto, for instance, claimed that the use of mathematics and empirical factors—such as combinations of goods indifferent to individuals—gave economic theory the rigor of rational mechanics.