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Sure there is 'no risk'... but a lot of plebs don't know that. They don't even know that once September approaches the bip-110 will 'auto-activate'... and their nodes will have different rules from the vast majority of miners. There could easily be a 'hard-fork'... and any transactions they make could easily leave their utxos vulnerable confusing their view of the entire network.

My understanding is that 110 nodes once "active" will sever connections with core nodes putting them on a new network leaving 'their new' network incredibly vulnerable - it is a terrible idea and creates 2 tokens.

Influencers IMO are leading plebs down a dark path they are not accurately explaining.

It is not known in advance whether miners will or will not implement bip110. The bip110 nodes will sever the connection to the non-bip110 nodes after bip110 activates not at the point of activation, but as soon as the first non-bip110 complient block gets mined.

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Why would miners actively decide to give up revenue???

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I don't think anybody gives up revenue.

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100 sats \ 2 replies \ @Murch 2 Feb

When miners are working on two chaintips, only one of them will become part of the longest chain. From the perspective of the longest chaintip, the stale chaintip might as well not exist: the miners expended the effort to mine, but their block reward doesn’t exist in the longest chain.

There are three possible outcomes:

  • The soft forking chain gains majority hashrate and wipes out the non-forking chain. In that case, the miners that mined the non-forking chain bet incorrectly and lose their rewards.
  • The soft forking chain only garners minority hashrate and falls behind in total work. Miners that mined the soft forking chain expended the effort to create the blocks but didn’t get paid in the main chain. They give up and rejoin the majority chain.
  • Neither side wants to give up their rewards, the split is made permanent, and each set of miners gets paid only on their chaintip. Both sides have slower blocks until they reach the next difficulty adjustment, which takes longer for the minority hashrate side, significantly longer if the split is very uneven. If it is almost completely one-sided, mining 2016 blocks at the pre-split difficulty may well be economically unfeasible.

All that to say, whoever ends up on the losing side of reorgs “gives up”/looses revenue.

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You are almost correct. The incorrect part is that if the soft fork chain has more hash rate, the old clients will have to discard their bip110 non-copmlient blocks and they will accept the aoft form chain. That is exactly because it is a soft fork - blocks mined by the new rules are seen as valid by the old clients.

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That’s the first case:

The soft forking chain gains majority hashrate and wipes out the non-forking chain. In that case, the miners that mined the non-forking chain bet incorrectly and lose their rewards.
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