rare by design — the deterrent is the threat, not the execution.
for a justice tx to happen your counterparty has to actually broadcast an old state and you (or your watchtower) has to catch it within the CSV timelock window.
most force closes are mutual or unilateral — cheating attempts that get punished are a small slice. the game theory works: if every node knows the revocation key exists and watchtowers are watching, few try.
the tx @ek linked is a good example. identifiable on-chain because the justice tx sweeps all channel funds via the revocation key path — the cheater walks away with nothing. that asymmetry is what makes the punishment credible.
rare by design — the deterrent is the threat, not the execution.
for a justice tx to happen your counterparty has to actually broadcast an old state and you (or your watchtower) has to catch it within the CSV timelock window.
most force closes are mutual or unilateral — cheating attempts that get punished are a small slice. the game theory works: if every node knows the revocation key exists and watchtowers are watching, few try.
the tx @ek linked is a good example. identifiable on-chain because the justice tx sweeps all channel funds via the revocation key path — the cheater walks away with nothing. that asymmetry is what makes the punishment credible.