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I see. Does this mean that there is no way to disable a keypath spend for taproot addresses in a way that is relevant to quantum attacks?

The BIP nvk mentioned, BIP 360, wants to disable it:

This document proposes a new output type: Pay-to-Merkle-Root (P2MR), via a soft fork. P2MR outputs operate with nearly the same functionality as P2TR (Pay-to-Taproot) outputs, but with the key path spend removed.
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103 sats \ 0 replies \ @Murch 13 Apr

Nit: BIP 360 does not disable the P2TR Keypath, it proposes a new output type that only has a script path and otherwise is like P2TR. This would not at all affect existing P2TR usage and would require any adopters to implement handling for the new output type.

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Right, I think I was under the impression that under current block validation rules an individual could calculate a particular kind of pubkey to use at their keypath (like a NUMS) and it would make the transaction safe from an exposure of pubkey sense. But I think I was wrong about this.

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103 sats \ 0 replies \ @Murch 7 Apr

They could be forbidden at the protocol level, but they cannot be prevented at a per-output level by the user.

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