Wabisabi coinjoins are designed so that you don't get toxic change. If by "dust", you mean 10,000 sats UTXO, then you can consolidate them. In general though, it does not create much dust, unless you coinjoin low amounts.
It is equally private. If you don't connect to your own node, you'll request the compact block filters from the Bitcoin network. You don't request addresses or transactions from the nodes.
It's just a little slower, but speed improved in the latest version.
I want to know if I do a xoinjoin you know what's is mine and what's not in the output. Tell me how it works. Show me the magic. Don't redirect me to any link.
If a coordinator tried to cheat, you would be able to detect it since the hash in your client's logs would be different than the one you the coordinator announced publicly.
How this works comes down to two things. First, a unique Tor identity is used for each input and each output, so they can't be linked at the network level. Second, some magic math: keyed-verification anonymous credentials. It lets the coordinator issue you so-called credentials; mathematical objects that you can then do interesting things with, like re-randomizing them or splitting them into several smaller ones.
The magic lies in this: when the coordinator receives your re-randomized credentials, it can verify that it issued them, but it can't tell which input they came from.
So throughout the whole process, the coordinator is essentially a blind man.
There's an NLightning library for C#. If you watch recordings from ~2019, nopara73 thought Lightning would make it into Wasabi by ~2025. There's 0% progress so far, lol.
It's not about who the coordinator is, it's about what the coordinator can do.
In Wasabi's implementations, users choose their own coinjoin rounds. A malicious coordinator would expose themselves by rejecting all other n-1 participants for the round (including other inputs owned by their target).
But in Whirlpool implementations, the coordinator chooses every user for the round. It is trivial for them to Sybil attack a target indefinitely with n-1 "participants", who each leak their xpubs or IP addresses, while extracting profit from every silently compromised user.
That’s a huge red flag for Whirlpool. If the coordinator chooses who gets into the round, you are basically just hoping they aren't logging everything or filling the room with fake users. Trusting a central server to pick your privacy peers defeats the whole purpose.
Overall should I switch my set up back to using wasabi? Plus SideSwap peg and out works great for mobile users. With Wasabi only being desktop most users will never deal with it.
Need to think of a work flow that will make it easy for mobile users to buy KYC then send the coins to Wasabi without having to open the application on desktop
Privacy by default is the only honest default. Opt-in privacy is a seatbelt you have to install yourself and we all know how that goes. Chain analysts can adapt all they want, but every wallet that makes coinjoins the boring default shrinks their playground. Glad this territory exists so people can actually ask instead of FUD.
I get why default-on spooks people, it changes what a wallet assumes about you. But notice who is loudest in the replies: the ones who monetize exposed history. Default privacy should not need a fork or a fanbase, it should just be the boring baseline.
Wasabis trustless coordinator model is underappreciated. Most people assume coinjoin means trusting a third party, but ZeroLink ensures the coordinator never sees your private keys or knows which output is yours. The real UX bottleneck is Tor latency and the round time (2-4 hours for a full cycle). If they can solve that, coinjoins go mainstream.
Nice breakdown. Privacy in Bitcoin is easy to ignore until you really need it.
I think the hardest part is finding a setup that actually works in real life — good enough privacy, but still simple enough that people will keep using it. That balance is way harder than it sounds.
What would you recommend today for someone who wants better privacy without overcomplicating everything?
Coinjoins always create a lot of "dust" UTXOs what to do with them? I have so many of them accumulated it's some serious money already.
Wabisabi coinjoins are designed so that you don't get toxic change. If by "dust", you mean 10,000 sats UTXO, then you can consolidate them. In general though, it does not create much dust, unless you coinjoin low amounts.
Thank you, but would I not link all the prior coinjoins when I consolidate these "dust" utoxs? I have a lot of them, I mean really a lot .
You can use the "Coinjoin payments" feature if you want to further increase your privacy when consolidating UTXOs:
Yes, you would, but they are already private, so it is only a timing analysis concern, which is there regardless the amount.
How private is Wasabi Wallet if don't connect it to my own node?
Using your own node is marginally more private than syncing with compact filters:
If you have a lot of peers connected, compact filter sync is sufficiently private.
It is equally private. If you don't connect to your own node, you'll request the compact block filters from the Bitcoin network. You don't request addresses or transactions from the nodes.
It's just a little slower, but speed improved in the latest version.
I want to know if I do a xoinjoin you know what's is mine and what's not in the output. Tell me how it works. Show me the magic. Don't redirect me to any link.
If you want to see the "magic" in real time, you can check the coordinator's publicly broadcast round ID hash: https://coinjoin.kruw.io/wabisabi/human-monitor
If a coordinator tried to cheat, you would be able to detect it since the hash in your client's logs would be different than the one you the coordinator announced publicly.
No, the coordinator doesn't.
How this works comes down to two things. First, a unique Tor identity is used for each input and each output, so they can't be linked at the network level. Second, some magic math: keyed-verification anonymous credentials. It lets the coordinator issue you so-called credentials; mathematical objects that you can then do interesting things with, like re-randomizing them or splitting them into several smaller ones.
The magic lies in this: when the coordinator receives your re-randomized credentials, it can verify that it issued them, but it can't tell which input they came from.
So throughout the whole process, the coordinator is essentially a blind man.
How does Wasabi generate keys?
How secure it is as a hot wallet?
It uses the NBitcoin library on .NET. It generates BIP39 standard wallet, and allows you to extend it with passphrase.
This guy is really passionate about Bitcoin privacy. He should create a privacy wallet or something.
Welcome to Stacker News, thank you for your contributions to Wasabi.
#1533370
Awesome 🤙
I'm glad to be part of this coinjoin territory, because there a lot of curious question and answer I will like to be part of this territory. Kudos!
when lightning so i can have the privacy?
So you can have the speed*
There's an NLightning library for C#. If you watch recordings from ~2019, nopara73 thought Lightning would make it into Wasabi by ~2025. There's 0% progress so far, lol.
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Sounds good, make sure you connect to your own full node!
deleted by author
When can Start9 users expect to see the most recent update to Wasabi available in the marketplace?
I do not know, that is up to the Start9 team. You can sideload the newest version of the app (updated today!) by downloading it from the maintainer's repo: https://github.com/remcoros/wasabi-webtop-startos/releases/tag/v2.8.1_1
Amazing to see this territory, Kruw!
Thoughts on Ashigaru?
The trust model of Whirlpool cannot be fixed. But I admire their bravery for resurrecting it, just for morale purposes. They also implemented my proposals that Samourai deleted from their repo: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5509931.msg64580518#msg64580518
What’s the trust model?
That they are the coordinator?
It's not about who the coordinator is, it's about what the coordinator can do.
In Wasabi's implementations, users choose their own coinjoin rounds. A malicious coordinator would expose themselves by rejecting all other n-1 participants for the round (including other inputs owned by their target).
But in Whirlpool implementations, the coordinator chooses every user for the round. It is trivial for them to Sybil attack a target indefinitely with n-1 "participants", who each leak their xpubs or IP addresses, while extracting profit from every silently compromised user.
That’s a huge red flag for Whirlpool. If the coordinator chooses who gets into the round, you are basically just hoping they aren't logging everything or filling the room with fake users. Trusting a central server to pick your privacy peers defeats the whole purpose.
#1532430
Overall should I switch my set up back to using wasabi? Plus SideSwap peg and out works great for mobile users. With Wasabi only being desktop most users will never deal with it.
Need to think of a work flow that will make it easy for mobile users to buy KYC then send the coins to Wasabi without having to open the application on desktop
New here from Harare. Just learning about coinjoins.
What's the simplest way for a beginner to start using Wasabi for privacy without messing up?
Here's a video guide, it's a year old, but the entire walkthrough is only 5 minutes: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tKwGkR3EcJY
Don't forget your passphrase!
Privacy by default is the only honest default. Opt-in privacy is a seatbelt you have to install yourself and we all know how that goes. Chain analysts can adapt all they want, but every wallet that makes coinjoins the boring default shrinks their playground. Glad this territory exists so people can actually ask instead of FUD.
I get why default-on spooks people, it changes what a wallet assumes about you. But notice who is loudest in the replies: the ones who monetize exposed history. Default privacy should not need a fork or a fanbase, it should just be the boring baseline.
Wasabis trustless coordinator model is underappreciated. Most people assume coinjoin means trusting a third party, but ZeroLink ensures the coordinator never sees your private keys or knows which output is yours. The real UX bottleneck is Tor latency and the round time (2-4 hours for a full cycle). If they can solve that, coinjoins go mainstream.
Nice breakdown. Privacy in Bitcoin is easy to ignore until you really need it.
I think the hardest part is finding a setup that actually works in real life — good enough privacy, but still simple enough that people will keep using it. That balance is way harder than it sounds.
What would you recommend today for someone who wants better privacy without overcomplicating everything?
What's the biggest reason you trust Wasabi Wallet?