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0 sats \ 8 replies \ @nerd2ninja 18 Jan \ on: Scaling LN routing with Chaumian eCash lightning

I’ve been thinking about whether routing nodes might be able to make use of federated eCash between themselves as a kind-of L3 in order to facilitate LN routes between nodes which don’t have channels between them.

You know what would be better than this? An n-of-n multi-party channel.

Come on, read PeterTodd's reply to my post about how there's concerns over LNSymmetry not working well in untrusted environments and apply that level of detail of adversarial thinking to the things you come up with. You know about how, in an untrusted environment a 10 node multi-party channel could only be 2 actual people behind all of those nodes.

Think about the type of adversarial thinking it took to come up with the replacement cycling attack: https://www.nobsbitcoin.com/how-does-a-lightning-replacement-cycling-attack-work/ How might that affect what you've come up with?

E-cash federations require trust. Even the people promoting fedi-mints are only promoting it for people to support their local communities as in you know who the fedi-mint custodians are. Because if you don't know who they are, they could claim to be a fedi-mint and actually be 1 person with a multi-sig wallet.

https://thebitcoinmanual.com/articles/fedimint-federation/

These trust assumptions are:

Custody: The user must trust the Federation Guardians with custody of their funds, which introduces custodial risk. LN Pay: The user must trust “1 of n” Lightning Gateways to pay lightning invoices outside of the mint. LN Receive: The user must trust “1 of n” Lightning Gateways to receive lightning payments into the mint. Tx Execution: The user must trust a quorum of Federation Guardians to process transactions (deposit, redemption, swap, contract enforcement).

0 sats \ 7 replies \ @gd OP 18 Jan

I’m not advocating for untrusted parties to form federations. I’m more so exploring the idea of trusted parties forming routing federations for greater network reach and higher liquidity efficiency between them.

0 sats \ 6 replies \ @nerd2ninja 18 Jan

An n-of-n multi-party channel is still better in that case.

0 sats \ 5 replies \ @gd OP 18 Jan

What benefits would the n-of-n multi-party channel give us over the eCash style?

0 sats \ 4 replies \ @nerd2ninja 18 Jan

Well its n-of-n (so no signatory collusion) with unilateral exit. Even if you assume a trusted multi-party channel, if almost all members of the multi-party channel became uncoorperative (died, went offline, what have you) you can still exit (get your funds out) without them. Even if you assume a pretty bad multi-party channel where you're using current day mainnet and with no justice transactions (because you trust so much) the unilateral exit is still relevant.

There is a multi-party channel proposals that do have justice transactions by the way, just want to put that out there: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/918.pdf

AND when you build all of that out, you don't have to build an interoperability layer or convince the network to use a different routing mechanism like you guys were talking about in another comment

0 sats \ 3 replies \ @gd OP 18 Jan freebie

Hmm, my understanding is that the all signatories must sign all transactions in a n-of-n. So there is no unilateral exit and a single signatory has the ability to censor a given transaction. Isn't that what gives immunity to signatory collusion?