In my replace-by-fee-rate post, I called this kind of concept the highest minable fee-rate.
Yes, and the people that have been working on this topic in the past few years speak of "mining score" and "feerate diagram comparison" in this context.
It's increasing the fee-rate of a transaction in isolation. But from the point of view of miners it is not increasing the fee-rate of the immediately mineable mempool, because you have to mine a low fee-rate transaction first to access the high fee-rate.
While that might have been the intention, it is not how RBF is implemented today. I would expect you to know this, given your involvement in the original work and your recent advocacy for mempoolfullrbf. If you have not read them yet, you may find Suhas’s overview of Cluster Mempool and Gloria’s numerous write-ups for RBF, package relay, v3 transactions, etc. interesting.
Yes, and the people that have been working on this topic in the past few years speak of "mining score" and "feerate diagram comparison" in this context.
I know. If you'd gone to the link I provided you'd see that I used a different term because for use in replace-by-fee-rate, I proposed an simpler algorithm that is not identical to mining score.
While that might have been the intention, it is not how RBF is implemented today. I would expect you to know this
I'm aware. I was responding your confusing way of explaining this stating that "the replacement does increase the feerate" by explaining how from a miner's perspective the feerate has not been increased. Your reply was glossing over the fact that RBF as implemented right now is clearly broken in the circumstance that your replacement cycle exploits, as @shafemtol pointed out.
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Yes, it doesn’t improve the best mining score among the transactions in the example. It does increase the overall fees per vsize across the set of transactions we are examining. It depends on the size of the mempool and the overall position in the mempool of the examined set of transactions to determine which of those two are more attractive to miners. If there are few transactions available for mining, increasing the total fees may be preferable over a higher feerate transaction with a lower total fee.
What you are describing in the context of "highest minable fee-rate" is equivalent to the concept of mining score. If the (ancestorless) parent has a higher feerate, the parent’s mining score matches its own feerate as does the child’s mining score match the child’s feerate. If the child has a higher feerate, they share a mining score that falls between the parent’s feerate and the child’s feerate.
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