Of course!

So in a setup where you use a standard 24 word seed phrase + passphrase, you are creating a new "wallet" with each passphrase (you can make as many as you want). So, in this instance the thought process is as follows:

Wallet #1: Base 24 word seed phrase.

This is the least secure of them all, because if your seed phrase was compromised it would be the easiest to access.

Wallet #2-Infinity: Base 24 word seed phrase + passphrase.

These are the more secure layers of your seed phrase (keys). If your 24 word seed phrase is compromised, you still have the passphrase protecting the funds in these wallets. There is no way to know whether or not a passphrase is being used on a seed, so typically the attacker would either move on or try to brute force the seed phrases.

With those things in mind, the idea is to create some plausible deniability. So on Wallet #1, you should store some funds. That way if your keys are compromised, the attacker may think they got your whole stack. You could then sweep the funds from your Wallet#2 (protected by passphrase) off those keys entirely and re-secure your stack.

The decoy stack also allows for you to watch that parent wallet on the base 24 word seed phrase. So if you see any movement on it that is not your movement, then you can sweep and secure any held under a passphrase.

Keep in mind, its good to make the parent stack big enough and with enough activity to make it seem believable. Moving like 50k sats to it one time will not be convincing to anyone. Plus, in all actuality, those funds should remain secure under normal circumstances. There is nothing inherently insecure about the 24 word seed phrase, outside of the fact that the seed phrase exists in the physical world and could potentially be compromised if not secured properly or exposed via coercion.