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My take is that many things can work, and the best thing to do is to be really detailed about your threat model. Almost nobody does this, but it's the most important thing.
  • What happens if your house burns down?
  • What happens if there's a tornado or flood and the whole area is fucked?
  • What happens if a burglar who knows you have btc breaks into your place while you're away for the weekend?
  • What if you need to bug out with no notice?
  • What happens if your partner turns evil?
  • What happens if you die?
  • What happens when there are cameras everywhere?
  • What happens if person X (pick someone useful -- NVK; Craig Raw; Trump; the Postmaster General) is trying to steal your btc?
  • What if someone breaks into your safe deposit box?
  • What if you get a keylogger installed on your computer?
I don't think asking these questions points to any particular answer, but it should at least clarify the various ways things could fall out and what the outcomes and precautions could / should be in response to, or in an attempt to prevent, that fallout.
Useful list, thanks.
I would add...what happens if you have a somewhat complex setup, and you just don't remember the details? Or seed phrase with a passphrase attached, and you know you'll always remember the passphrase, and then...you don't. Apparently that's one of THE most common ways to lose bitcoin.
But mostly I want to talk about the hardware wallet arguments here. Like...why specifically a purchased HARDWARE WALLET as opposed to a DIY version?
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what happens if you have a somewhat complex setup, and you just don't remember the details? Or seed phrase with a passphrase attached, and you know you'll always remember the passphrase, and then...you don't.
Probably the most important one and I didn't even list it. Yes.
But mostly I want to talk about the hardware wallet arguments here.
That's why I listed the threat model questions. The argument about HW wallet depends on what you think might happen. Busted secure element? NVK selling your shipping info to the CIA?
Vs Seed Signer -- having a piece of paper where, to simply look at the paper for one second compromises your entire stash, seems like a tradeoff I don't want personally.
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Regarding the Seed Signer...even if you have some other signing device (regular hardware wallet like ColdCard, Ledger, etc), you'll always have a seed phrase backup, right?
And the backup would be stored/hidden in whatever way you think is best for your situation. So, I don't see that backing up a Seed Signer seed phrase is necessarily any different from backing up a ColdCard seed phrase. Am I missing something?
I do agree that, especially as bitcoin becomes more valuable and people start understanding what it is, having a list of 12 words anywhere that's remotely available/visible is a horrible idea. Obfuscating them somehow seems critical.
Here's a like with a list of potential concerns/considerations for using SeedSigner: https://github.com/SeedSigner/independent_custody_guide?tab=readme-ov-file#alright-but-theres-got-to-be-a-catch-right
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