17 sats \ 0 replies \ @oomahq 16 May \ on: Cashu: This will allow integrating Ecash into existing KYC/AML infrastructure bitcoin
I don't get why so many people are surprised. Ecash is custodian technology, therefore it was always a matter of time until it grew KYC prongs.
Regardless of how many mints will want to use them, but seems obvious there'll be demand.
51 sats \ 0 replies \ @oomahq 12 May \ parent \ on: What has happened to Bitcoin Magazine? 🧐 conspiracy
Always have been.jpg
Spain is small but rather diverse. Catalonia probably is in the less gregarious, wild and extroverted end of the country.
You're right. But he can't KYC himself to the arbiter when he is asked for proof of ownership of that bank account. Unless he manages to trick the protein powder buyer into giving him a scan of his national ID card or something.
Fortunately I never had to go to arbitration so far, so I don't know for sure, but I see no reason why the arbiter would forward each parties submissions to each other.
That would defeat the point of catching scammers.
Nobody said arbitraging is an easy job. Still, I don't see any better alternative to protect sellers somewhat from triangulation attacks.
By the way, the scammer doesn't know nor would be able to guess the bank account number that sent the fiat transfer.
At least in Bisq arbitrators are people of good reputation who also posted some collateral to do this job and earn some income from doing it.
I believe in case of dispute buyer and seller must submit evidence to convince him to rule in their favor.
In the particular case of a triangulation, the seller would submit evidence of the suing, and the scammer buyer would not be able to submit proof of payment for the sats, as he didn't pay for them.
It's unlikely that that guy was trying to scam you, rather he was the real victim of the scam. This is what it's called a triangulation attack. It works like this:
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The real scammer puts up an ad to sell whatever, in this case protein powder (but it doesn't exist).
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A prospective buyer is interested, and the scammer sends him the payment details. These payment details are not his, but rather those he got from a seller at the LNP2PBot or another P2P exchange, in this case your payment details.
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The protein powder buyer pays for the Bitcoin purchase in fiat, thinking he's purchasing protein powder. You see the fiat hitting your bank account and approve the release of the sats to the scammer's address, which at this point disappears forever.
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A few days later the police knocks on the door of the Bitcoin seller, who's been sued by the protein powder buyer who never got the product he thought he was purchasing.
Note that Bitcoin buyers on LNP2PBot and such are not vulnerable to this attack, but on the other hand sellers have no way to protect themselves from it.
The mitigation would be for those platforms to require buyers to post a bond of at least 2x times the amount they want to purchase, and freeze it for 2-4 weeks.
This way the scammer would have nothing to gain from the scam, and even if that didn't deter him the scammer's bond would be confiscated and used to pay back both the seller and the non-bitcoin buyer.
Ordinal theory is a scam targeting cryptobros and inscriptions are a software vulnerability of Bitcoin Core. It's not really that confusing.
On the other hand it's not clear to me how (or even if?) Whirlpool and Wasabi were able to mitigate this threat.
Fidelity bonds arbitrarily raise the cost to be a sybil attacker (e.g. you need to cough up and provably freeze for some time 4X more BTC than you want to coinjoin, for instance).
I think the problem of sybil participants is not that they stall the process, but that they enter the anonset with lots of UTXOs, manage to include several of their UTXOs in each coinjoin, and then trivially trace the other participants who coinjoin with several of their UTXOs.
If you actually look in detail what a bitcoin transaction is, sats are just an integer number annotated in each transaction output. Again, you cannot identify the individual units that compose an integer number.
You can pretend you can, of course. But it's not the same thing as actually being able to.
It's possible inasmuch as selling lunar plots is also possible. There's also many different ways of partitioning the moon and sell the plots to credulous people, yet it's clearly still a scam.
Pretending you're able to identify individual units of an integer number is not any different.