pull down to refresh
721 sats \ 2 replies \ @turbolay 20 Nov 2023 freebie \ on: Evaluating my bitcoin privacy techniques against three surveillance attacks bitcoin
Nice piece.
I'm interested into the overseer: up to which point does remixing solve it? it seems that after 2 consecutive coinjoins, the attack must be an amount analysis, where you analyze all coins going in and out coinjoin rounds from a same coordinator.
Wasabi already handles quite efficiently all 3 cases (even in the economic profile) because:
- it enforces 2 remixes as a minimum
- it never reuses addresses, and won't consider that you gained privacy if you did
- there is a configurable dust threshold, and if you receive UTXOs lower than this threshold on already used addresses, they're ignored.
But as you mentioned, correct usage of privacy software is primordial to stay private. For eg in Wasabi we see some user deanon themselves because they swept 100% of their funds, and didn't pay enough fees to avoid amount analysis. I've seen the same in Samourai rounds
zkSNACKs, same as Wasabi Wallet. So users of both services are participating in the same rounds. zkSNACKs enforces UTXOs to be analyzed and approved by a third party before they can participate in rounds for compliance reasons, and even if this is debatable in terms of Bitcoin ethics, it doesn't undermine users' privacy as the third party has no more information than what's available on the blockchain.
GENESIS