Example argument: “DC node = more validation costs = higher minimum requirement for profitable mining. And they absolutely do gain an advantage, extra income.” @brian_trollz
Me expanding on that idea (and hopefully not turning it into a strawman): Adding costs to miners shuts out some new entrants. Mining is already a pretty expensive field to enter, e.g. a rig with the latest asics can cost $10,000 or more. Keeping the cost of mining low allows people to mine at home. If mining becomes an ever more costly industry to enter, existing players and the very wealthy might take it over completely, giving them power to censor transactions.
My answer: Drivechain doesn’t introduce new costs to miners. Running sidechain software is optional for every miner. One reason why a miner might choose to completely avoid it is because they earn revenue without doing anything new. Drivechain users have to pay bitcoin fees to commit their drivechain’s blocks to bitcoin. Bitcoin miners can just sit back and let those fees roll in. They have the option to run a drivechain node, validate its transactions, and personally commit the drivechain’s blocks to bitcoin (and thus collect fees on the drivechain in addition to bitcoin fees), but they don’t have to. They make money either way.
Another answer: Drivechains don’t introduce sidechain costs because sidechains already exist. You can’t introduce something that’s already here. Sidechains like namecoin and rootstock, as well as my sidechain launcher, already pay bitcoin miners to commit to sidechain blocks in bitcoin’s blockchain. Today, right now, without drivechain, most mining pools run sidechain software to collect fees on sidechains in addition to collecting bitcoin fees. Running sidechain software has a cost, but most pools choose to do it anyway because the revenue outweighs the cost. Drivechain is better than today’s sidechains, but drivechains don’t cost more to run than sidechains do today, and – like with today’s sidechains – they are completely optional. Only the miners who want to do drivechain stuff run drivechain nodes.
Example argument: “this is a big reason for which I'm against bip300. It creates new perverted incentives for miners to extract more value from the ordering of the transactions or reorgs besides the fees they get from layer 1.” @zndtoshi
Me expanding on that idea (and hopefully not turning it into a strawman): Hacks and forks on a drivechain can lead some users to try to withdraw coins that other users claim are theirs. Both sides might clamor for bitcoin miners to block someone else’s withdrawal, and get hysterical and demand that bitcoin miners orphan a bitcoin block if a contentious withdrawal occurs in it. If a significant part of a miner’s revenue comes from that drivechain, that miner might listen to the drivechain’s users. Problems on the drivechain can therefore overflow to bitcoin, leading to reorgs and forks on bitcoin (hugely disruptive) to fix the drivechain’s problems.
My answer: I agree that some miners are likely to respond to contention on drivechains and I don’t think that’s a bad thing. The practice will do them good. If the future world relies on bitcoin to process its transactions, bitcoin will have to deal with the contentious parts. Fork fights are nothing, imagine a world where nations in a real war pressure miners to orphan blocks containing payments to their adversaries. If bitcoin has weaknesses in this area, if people can pay our miners to orphan our blocks and reorg our chain, I’d like to find out sooner rather than later. Let the sidechainers try their hardest to censor transactions on bitcoin. If they succeed, that means bitcoin has a vulnerability, and we will either fix it or learn it can’t be fixed. Either is better than fleeing the fight. The fight will come, and I’d like to be ready.
Another answer: This argument and the previous one both seem to assume that anything miners do other than mine bitcoin is bad and dangerous. Every economic action miners take will either bring profits or losses, failure or success, and either one can have an impact on miner incentives. Any new source of income for a miner, and any new cost, is a new way for someone to pressure them to do their bidding, a new way to twist the knife. But nonetheless, miners will seek out new sources of revenue – they are already doing it – and they will deal with the new costs they bring. That’s how each miner finds their edge. Drivechain doesn't "introduce" costs or fees, it recognizes that they are here and tries to leverage them to the advantage of bitcoin’s users.
Example argument: “The miners control withdrawals from drivechain to main chain. Essentially miners can steal coins if they want, which is not possible on main chain.” @vega113t
Me expanding on that idea (and hopefully not turning it into a strawman): Drivechain funds can be withdrawn to any bitcoin address as long as 51% of miners approve the withdrawal. This is supposed to be used by drivechain users to request that miners process a withdrawal of the user’s own coins to the user’s own bitcoin address, but nothing stops miners from withdrawing all the money in a drivechain and sending it to themselves. Therefore drivechain is essentially a new form of custody, and if it gets into bitcoin that sends a bad message. It says custody is fine, custody is a scaling solution, custody is approved by a consensus of bitcoin nodes, and at that point you might as well tell everyone to use coinbase.
My answer: You can make something an option for those who want it without recommending it for general use. I wouldn’t use drivechain if it was an option because I don’t want 51% of miners to custody my money. For a similar reason, I don’t use current sidechains, where some percentage of a fixed federation holds all the money. But that’s my personal preference. Even though I don’t use current sidechains, I think it’s good that people have the option to use them, notwithstanding that federated pegs are a type of custody. I want them to have the same option to use drivechain’s miner-enforced peg mechanism even though it’s also a type of custody. That doesn’t send the message that custody is recommended, only that freedom is a good thing. If you decide you want to use a drivechain, I don’t want to stop you, just inform you of the tradeoffs.
My answer: It seems to me that the compelling use case is to use bitcoin on three sidechains: one with monero’s privacy, one with the additional scripting functions of liquid or ethereum, and a "big block" one. (There are a few others but those are the only ones I hear lots of people say they want.) It’s true that you can already use bitcoin on current sidechains that have these properties, but in current sidechains the "peg out" mechanism relies on the honesty of a fixed federation, and some people think having 51% of miners hold the money is an improvement.
I personally think it’s an improvement in terms of censorship resistance. In a federated peg, the individual members of the federation can be corrupted or even eliminated by powerful forces of governments and corporate interests, and the security of the federation can be silently degraded in this way. With miners, when one leaves, another takes their place, and so the set of miners changes dynamically, even daily. Therefore drivechain gives us meaningfully better sidechains than the ones we have today, and I think that’s a good thing, because I’m a fan of tools for greater censorship resistance.
My answer: Freedom is the incentive for me. I’ve reviewed bip300 and decided that the code change is simple and harmless to me, it brings new revenue to miners, and some people want to use it to make better sidechains than the ones we have today. It seems like a good deal. Also, the very act of bringing in new freedom and new options can also bring in new users. That benefits all of us because the more users there are in bitcoin, the greater its network effects. A monetary system with more people, all other things being equal, is better than a monetary system with fewer people, because it means you can transact with more people and have consensus on a base monetary unit. So I support drivechain and am happy to help people test out the code. Let me know if you want to try a sidechain on the bip300 testnet.
The most important thing you miss in 3 is that this totally destroys bitcoin's incentive model. With drivechains miners no longer have the incentive to mine the next block, there is a greater incentive to mine steal from drivechains.
Imo because of this, drivechain is one of the worst proposals ever to come to bitcoin.
You're telling me that there will be a 51% mining cartel attack that will last for multiple months without individual miners moving to other pools and that it will be aggressively reorging out any block that doesn't vote along with them -- but without Drivechain everything would be ok in Bitcoin land?
I think they can only take the drivechain funds by mining a block containing a transaction that moves those funds into their own pockets. So they still have to mine the next block. Do you mean they have no incentive to mine the next sidechain block?
Not necessarily, they will likely be reorging out blocks that stop them from stealing. It just creates a greater incentive for 51% attacks
Can you reorg without extending the chain? I don't think so, the reorged chain has to be longer than the previous one or nodes will reject the reorg. So they still have to extend the chain in order to steal. I think I must be misunderstanding you.
if you're attempting a reorg you aren't mining on the latest block, you are mining on a previous block to attempt to remove the latest block.
I think I see what you mean now, by "mine the next block" I think you mean "build on top of whichever block was most recently mined prior to the reorg," whereas when I say "mine the next block" I mean "increase the number of blocks in the blockchain, regardless of the contents of your blocks."
Assuming I understand you properly now, I think that if a set of miners tries to steal from a drivechain, and another set tries to stop them, that is an example of contention. Bitcoin's censorship resistance relies on its ability to work amidst contention. If it can't operate in a situation where one group tries to censor another group's blocks, then it is not fit for purpose, because that is part of the real world bitcoin is designed for.
What I think should happen in that case is this: the set of miners with 51% hashrate will win by slowly extending the chain farther than the other set of miners. The other set of miners will have to capitulate because at some point the cost of performing their attack exceeds the reward. The moment that happens, it proves that bitcoin's method of working through reorgs works. If it doesn't happen, and we just get constant reorgs over and over, that proves that bitcoin's method of working through reorgs has a problem that must be fixed.
Either way, I don't think drivechain creates this problem, rather it helps us prepare for it ahead of time, because if the real world's economies adopt bitcoin, such contentions are inevitable, and I for one would like to know that bitcoin can handle them.
this is just generally incorrect.
PoW is not a method to achieve consensus under a different set of conflicting incentives. It is not a "method of working through reorgs".
It explicitly sets out to make it more profitable to mine on top of the next block according to a discrete incentive model. If reorgs occur then this incentive model is explicitly broken and the system is proven unstable ie. useless.
It's a careful balancing act and drivechains challenge this. "Preparing for this" is preparing for armageddon. You can be prepared all you want in the end the outcome is the same. We all die.
Imo if drivechain sidechains become worth stealing from and somebody has the ability to do it and decides to do it then the value of the sidechain drops and the value of on-chain increases and the attack stops.
I'm not able to adequately assess mining game-theory risks, but I think I'm pulling for this. Here's a few reasons why:
Privacy. Chain analytics will only get better, KYC laws will only get worse, governments will only get more authoritarian; privacy will only get more important. Liquid has confidential transactions, but it still displays the recieving and sending addresses, and are centralized institutions that can be pressured.
Miner revenue. This past bull market presents a more subtle path of NGU than we expected. When a different macro climate is occurring and we can't rely on NGU in the future to match the rate of the past, the fact that tx fees make up generally less than 5% of total miner revenue is an issue. I think drivechains is a superior option to Peter Todd's Tail Emission like Monero, or Jason P Lowery's use of taxpayer money to have the Pentagon defend the hashrate.
Ossification. Counterintuitive to bring ossification through a change, but since almost any change except a bug fix could be done on a sidechain, a decade from now, it could be seen as what brought ossification to the base chain.
It is the game theory risks and long range scenarios I am most interested in. I can appreciate right now that it would provide some utility, but it is hard to predict out what will evolve from it.
Yeah, I get that. We really went through most of the last bull market with the mempools clearing. I guess still like 2% or less of the world use bitcoin. But I think if there's any utility that can be added to (or reclaimed back to) bitcoin, the fees would be great. Bitcoin is #1, but if you go with tx fees (as Paul says "paying customers") Bitcoin is #4, behind Ethereum, Binance, and Uniswap. Those are "gas" currencies so it's comparing apples to oranges, but I think Bitcoin can be so good that we can still be able to compare apples to oranges and still like the orange coin better.
the option to not validate is not a feature because the alternative to validating is to outsource the cost by pointing hash power towards pools or entities who can afford to do so.
this outsourceable cost is unlike any cost miners have to deal with and incentivize consolidation of smaller hashing power and block creation capabilities to an oligopoly.
There is a second alternative: any miner can ignore drivechain entirely and just mine blocks the way they currently do. They will still make money off the drivechain without even paying attention to it, because if miners ignore a drivechain, its users have to pay bitcoin fees to commit their drivechain's blocks to bitcoin's blockchain inside normal, fee-paying bitcoin transactions.
this is not a real alternative because miners follow profit incentives first and foremost.
The miners I talk to do not seem to follow profit incentives with radical efficiency. They do not all mine RSK, even though it's profitable, they do not all move to regions with the cheapest energy, even though that means they are overpaying, they do not all have a side hustle, even though it would increase their revenues. In short, they do not act as if every possible profitable action is mandatory. The ones I talk to act like they have a smorgasbord of potentially profitable choices and they pick and choose among them, trying some and neglecting others. Mining a drivechain seems like it would be just another potentially profitable option among many.
It's the other way around, they do not all mine RSK because it's simply not that profitable at all.
Based on latest available data I could find, MM generated $32k/month for eligible miners. That is not even marginal that is a rounding error.
The pools who support it started doing so as a misguided marketing ploy to try to attract more hashrate and just can't be bothered to turn it off. I wouldn't be surprised if they were offered RSK shit tokens on top of that to make it worth their while.
Again, this is not remotely similar. They don't have the option of outsourcing the associated costs otherwise they would. If you told them they could flip a switch and pay the same energy rates as the cheapest miners do, they would.
RSK miners were not offered any other token other than rBTC AFAIK.
If miners net revenue is 10% of gross revenue, then 32k USD/month (RSK fees) is like mining 2.5 Bitcoin blocks for a reward of 320k for free. Not bad. Also, MEV is not accounted in that supposed 32k/month.
Finally, Bitcoin miners also merge mine RSK because they think it adds value to Bitcoin long term.
Great to see you here, you should do an AMA about rootstock here on stacker news. @k00b let's get that set up!
what is the current revenue?
Hey Sergio, if you're ever interested in hosting an AMA on Stacker News about RSK, feel free to DM us on Twitter to set up a time https://twitter.com/stacker_news
appreciate the thoughtful write up, excited to hear what everyone else on here thinks.
I think a strong discourse in a range of fields is important to come to truth.
My biggest concern is the unknown risks of this proposal. The goal we can hopefully all agree is to create the hardest money, that is censor-resistant and ultimately becomes the global standard.
Along the way there are many distractions that may come up, “let’s add this thing and that thing”, and before we know it we have a kitchen sink of shit that has a larger attack surface, fragments Bitcoin, and presents unknown problems. Would shitcoin drivechainers now have a say in Bitcoin dev and consensus? Would they start pushing unwanted changes to Bitcoin since they now have their foot in the door?
What if drivechains enable shitcoins that would otherwise go away? That would mean the shitcoin enemy is now within he gates of Bitcoin’s security model? How can we then say “Bitcoin not Crypto” at that point?
It is easy to look this from a dev perspective of “let’s just build shiny new stuff” but Bitcoin just needs to be perfect money, not a smart contract platform, not an NFT token defi casino. Unless there is a much deeper analysis and study done on the impact of drivechains I am very skeptical.
Maybe I have missed you arguments but that is what it looks like to me!
There are many unknown risks of not activating BIP300.
Will the lack of privacy on Bitcoin enable state co-option?
BIP300 might help with that.
Will the declining revenue for miners mean bitcoin transactions take weeks to settle, forcing users onto other chains?
BIP300 might help with that too.
Will the scarcity of bockspace on Bitcoin force most users to rely on a custodian?
BIP300 might even help with this.
I think it's much more risky not to activate BIP300.
BIP 300 has nothing to do with privacy, sure you can make privacy focused sidechains, but we already have liquid and no one uses it.
This makes no sense, the difficulty adjustment exists
If this is the scare, something like coinpools is a much better approach. It actually works on solving the problem rather than just creating another blockchain.
Maybe no one uses Liquid because
I agree with this, I would actually use a coinpool whereas I wouldn't use a drivechain. Coinpools are non-custodial and kind of like a lightning channel, just with more than 2 keyholders. But I also want drivechain to be an option for people.
Coinpools are those things you need two complicated new opcodes to implement and even then they still basically do not work as you need every member of the thing to be online for anyone else to transact?
Yes, it's very exciting!
Interesting, so now we can enter into a dialogue about these points dear Adeimantus.
Instead of the benefits you are looking at the risks of not activating something, which is must more difficult to argue for.
If we assume these are real concerns for Bitcoin, is BIP300 the only answer? Or are we trying to make BIP300 be all things for all people as if there was some fundamental flaws in Bitcoin that only this specific drivechain proposal can fix?
Do you have any specific arguments that can only be solved by drivechains?
I only want it to be one thing for some people. Not all people will want to use any new softfork. Drivechain would only be for people who trust miners to hold their coins while they use a sidechain.
They definitely help but I don't think lightning solves privacy. Widespread use of coinjoin probably solves it, but coinjoins are large transactions and they take up a lot of blockspace. Some people like to do them on sidechains, and some people would like to do that but they don't trust the sidechains that currently exist. I'd like to help them coinjoin on a sidechain they trust.
I don't think that is likely yet, not until lightning's reliability improves. (For me, as a daily user of lightning, about 10% of my transactions fail.) One of my hopes and dreams for lightning development is that various attempts to improve the network may lead to the discovery of scaling technology that is even better than lightning. If that happens, maybe that will onboard most of the world. But with lightning working the way it does right now, it is pretty unreliable as a payment method, at least in my experience, and therefore I don't think most of the world would like it very much if they tried to use it. I think they'd even prefer to go back to visa, if they had to use lightning as it exists right now. But that just means there are opportunities to improve lightning! It's gotten so much better over the years and I think it will continue to improve.
Not "only," no. I think there are usually multiple approaches to solve problems in bitcoin and several of them can work together to solve its remaining issues. Drivechain is one thing that helps us solve some problems. It helps with scalability, it helps with privacy, it helps with new script functions, but it's not a panacaea for everything, and I don't think it's a perfect, final solution for the things it helps with. But let not the perfect be the enemy of the good. Drivechain helps make better sidechains, it brings more fee revenue to miners, and it does not harm me or (hopefully) anyone else. That's good enough for me to want it.
Could you clarify for me please, are sidechains currently possible at all? Does Drivechain usher them in, or does it simply make it easier?
Sidechains are currently possible, current examples include liquid, rootstock, and namecoin. Drivechain lets us do them better.
Yes, that would be bad. I don't think drivechain is an example of a kitchen sink thing. Its simplicity and its focus on "let just do one thing well" is one of its strengths.
I don't think drivechain gives them a foot in the door. It puts them on a sidechain. "Make your mess on a sidechain" is my message to people who want to make unwanted changes to bitcoin. Drivechain lets us benefit from their madness, because anything you do on a blockchain has a fee attached. With today's altcoins, those fees benefit altcoin miners and stakers. With drivechain, those fees go toward bitcoin miners and help secure our coins.
Yes, bad people will try to change bitcoin to suit their scammy desires. That's how they operate and they won't stop. (#ChangeTheCode, anyone?) But drivechain doesn't help them do it more, instead, to the extent that bad people use drivechain, it takes their fees and uses them to secure our coins.
I don't think drivechain puts the enemy in bitcoin, I think it relegates them to a sidechain. The reasons why altcoins die natural deaths still apply to drivechains. For an altcoin to survive, it has to attract users, who (typically) quickly find that the altcoin is just a utility token that is there to take their money and offer them nothing in return. At least on drivechains the fees go to bitcoin miners instead of to scammers. That's a definite improvement.
Putting those things on drivechains instead of on bitcoin helps me secure my coins without adding smart contract rules or nft silliness to bitcoin. If people are going to pay ridiculous fees to make nfts and gamble on defi, I'd rather those fees go to securing my coins than go to ethereum scammers.
I appreciate and value your skepticism and I hope posts like this are the kind of analysis and research you are looking for. I'm doing my best. :)
No problem. I am trying to find truth as well as you are!
I still feel like the conception of the value of having Drivechains is misaligned though.
Drivechains assume to a degree that there is inherent value in tokens and NFTs and "stuff" that is not Bitcoin. But what if this is wrong? What if the whole token thing is a mutation of a flawed idea that was given unwarranted attention and energy in recent years?
I cannot think of an easy analogy, but it is like we have this lean, streamlined aircraft that is Bitcoin, but some people want to add these heavy concrete blocks that are functionally useless on the promise that it will help the airplane fly faster? (Sorry that is a bit rough)
The mining fee argument and trail emissions is a seperate topic which requires an in-depth study I think, but ultimately if Bitcoin requires Drivechains to makeup the fees to keep the miners going then I feel we have already failed.
I would like to flip this conversation though!
Could you please give me the strongest and most important reasons for why this proposal is important for Bitcoin?
It's an improvement over the current way we do sidechains by making them more censorship resistant. That's all I've got. It's not a magical panacaea that "saves bitcoin" from huge and important problems. It's more like taproot, which was very good but not something we added because bitcoin would die without it. Take all the things we can do right now with sidechains, and to all of those things, apply the adjective "now more censorship resistant!" That's what drivechain gives us.
BTW on your airplane analogy, I think you are saying that NFTs and defi are the heavy concrete blocks, and what I am saying is that drivechain does not add them to bitcoin. It puts them on separate airplanes, but now the guys who work on our airplane get paid better, because they get the money from the tickets people paid to get on those other airplanes. With that money, they are in a better position to keep us more safe and secure. But our airplane didn't change (well, it barely changed -- bip300 is a very simple softfork that just adds a new type of timelock). It's still as sleek and fast as ever.
Can you give some examples of current sidechains please?
I'm not sure why there's no monero sidechain but if there was I would add it to the list. I don't think anyone really cares about another one beyond those. I would add a big block sidechain too, but liquid and rootstock already support big blocks, so they take care of that.
I had heard of Liquid, but I did not realise Namecoin was available as a sidechain. What are the differences in the peg process vs bip300?
What is the incentive for a side chain to stay on Bitcoin longterm?
Yeah, namecoin was the like the prototype for future sidechains, Satoshi Nakamoto helped conceptualize merge mining when namecoin was originally created, back then it was called BitDNS. It didn't attempt to do a two way peg with bitcoin though, so it's not like modern sidechains in that respect.
In liquid and rootstock there is a group called a federation who runs a multisig bitcoin address. To put money on the sidechain, you're supposed to send money to that multisig address and specify what address on the sidechain belongs to you. The sidechain then detects that you put X bitcoins into the multisig and that same amount shows up in your sidechain address. When you are done using the sidechain you are supposed to burn however many sidechain coins you have at that point and tell the federation what bitcoin address to send the corresponding amount of bitcoins to. Then you trust them to do that, and the fact that it's a multisig is supposed to help reassure you. As long as you trust a sufficient number of the people in the multisig, the federation cannot steal your money without corrupting the people you trust.
Bip300 itself does not have anything obvious in common with any of that, it just creates a new timelock. A bip300 timelock is similar to
OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY, which is the timelock where you can only spend your coins after waiting X blocks. Bip300's new timelock is different because it lets miners increase the value of X through a 51% vote. That way, if two people try to withdraw the same coins from a sidechain whose deposit address uses this timelock, miners have time to decide which one should "win," and their ability to increase the value of X lets them pause one withdrawal attempt, if necessary, to let the other one go through. But since it takes 51% of miners to lengthen the timelock, 51% of miners have to agree on which withdrawal attempt should "win."
It's a pretty clever way for sidechain makers to let bitcoin miners process sidechain withdrawals. One of the things I like about it is that it's a very simple primitive: it just gives us a new type of timelock. All the complicated logic about miner incentives and sidechain game theory is built on top of just a simple little timelock. I think that's cool.
Must 51% of miners be able to co-ordinate in order for BIP300 to be safe? Because one of the beauties of bitcoin is miners dont have to coordinate in order for it to be safe. And by the time miners have coordinates to increaes the timevalue thing, will it be too late?
They have three months to figure out which one to support. When each miner mines a bitcoin block they get to increment or decrement the timelock on a withdrawal attempt. So they don't have to talk to one another, just decide individually what they want to happen, and then the number will go up or down based on the action that each miner performs. If, without coordination, precisely 50% of miners + 1 increment it every time they mine a block, it will very gradually climb toward the height when the withdrawal goes through. If not, it will gradually recede back to it's initial value, allowing the rightful owner to get ahead.
I'm also simplifying a bit, you can read https://bips.xyz/300 for the full details.
Thanks this is a good explanation. What else could that timecode marker enable? Can it be used in non-side chain applications in any way?
I'm not sure. Under what circumstances would you want to have a timelock that miners can vote to lengthen? Maybe it could be useful in a vault scenario, where you have your coins in cold storage, but if a thief gets ahold of your private keys, you get time to notice the withdrawal attempt and petition miners to let you withdraw your coins instead (and pause the thief's withdrawal attempt).
I would like to hear from the Monero and Bcash communities and find out if they would consider converting into a a Bitcoin sidechain if DC was adopted. If they were enthusiastic and willing to convert then it would shed a more favorable light on these discussions imo.
and throw out their bags? why would they?
Is there not a a way to transfer their chains in without starting over? Like Eth coverting to PoS?
майнер не станет брать на себя ответственность за хранение... логика тут простоа. у кого ключи? 300 еще нужно доработать. Делайте работайте.
It seems to me that drivechains improves the user experience of Ethereum and its rollup centric roadmap because in Ethereum you have to select which network/rollup you want to use, then you have to double check you are using it (adresses look the same on each network/rollup) and funds are comonly lost as a result, and the rollups are not even decentralized they are just single sequencers producing blocks which is whom you trust, And honestly we are supporting this behavior by not providing a decentralized alternative like BIP300. These rollups are also growing faster than for example lightning. So in order to avoid a potential catastrophe where these PoA rollups/chains end up with a big network effect and makes hyper bitcoinzation take longer than neccesary and maybe not at all, BIP300 must happen? Just my 50 cents.
Chart of BTCs voting with their feet for Ethereums sidechains/rollups centric roadmap
I need to spend more time making this case but i think i am on to something.
How many drivechain sidechains can pools merge mine at a time?
can we do recursive drivechains in theory? Such hard limits suck.
You can do drivechains inside drivechains, so really, one drivechain is enough
deleted by author
deleted by author
Just another idea: Is there a process or paradigm for analysing the game theory of this and other kinds of changes to Bitcoin?
What I mean is, we are all aligned on Bitcoin at a high level, however as with the block size wars there may be different interpretations of "is this good for Bitcoin?"
An objective lens through which to look at these changes, the arguments for and against, and their impacts would be very valuable, covering things like incentives, decentralisation, scalability, long range attacks, etc.
E.g. What OP presents is a response to common objections to Drivechains, but what are the underlying benefits? Are those benefits only achievable through Drivechain and are they worth making the changes for, what are the incentives here? Will those incentives encourage things that are not good for Bitcoin as a whole long-term?
Yes, twitter threads
Seriously though, forums like stacker news and bitcoin twitter and podcasts are where this stuff typically gets hashed out. Experts in the subject matter are brought on to give their opinions and node operators listen in, sometimes ask questions, and ultimately decide whether or not to install the soft fork software on their nodes. It's how it's been done since the OP_P2SH softfork in the days when everyone hung out on bitcoin talk forums. Now we're spread around further and there are node operators all over the world, so the number of forums is bigger, but it's basically the same process. Bring in experts, ask them questions, make informed decisions. And sometimes sell hats to drum up support for your "side."