The iphone could become the biggest Bitcoin Wallet overnight
212 sats \ 17 comments \ @kilianbuhn 19 Mar 2022 bitcoin
There is a Bloomberg article about the possibility of Apple adding Crypto to the iPhone.
In short: Every iPhone has a secure enclave in which it is possible to store secret keys and get signatures out of it without accessing the key itself. This is similar to a cold wallet.
Of course everyone already can just download a hot wallet app and use it right away. But the secure enclave would provide additional safety. Also, Apples adoption rate is high and any integration with iMessage etc. would be HUGE for infrastructure.
Why do I think it will happen? Because the puzzle pieces are all aligned and Apple could spin it in a privacy-focused marketing campaign. I also think it will be ⚡ lightning ⚡ because of the speed.
My biggest hope is that we get a super user friendly lightning nodes in a few years on peoples phones or Homepods. For now, it will likely be custodial like the default blue wallet lightning wallet uses blue wallets node if you don't use your own node. Or maybe just an API for other apps to use.
Those are my speculations for next September. What do you think?
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8 sats \ 0 replies \ @617a7a 19 Mar 2022
Man I have so much I can say about this!
One of our first goals with my new startup (Valera Labs) is to create a wallet for Apple platforms like no other.
Every iPhone has a secure enclave in which it is possible to store secret keys and get signatures out of it without accessing the key itself. This is similar to a cold wallet.
This is true.
Our wallet will basically bridge the gap between Lightning, Bitcoin and Stacks. It’ll be one seamless experience where we bring the state-of-the-art tech currently worked on with something everyday people can use.
This will be extremely integrated into Apple’s tech stack, including iMessage integration. It’ll also automate the privacy techniques found in new wallets. Open-source, non-custodial.
The Secure Enclave
It’s a hardware-based key manager that’s isolated from the main processor to provide an extra layer of security. When keys are stored in the Secure Enclave, the app never actually handles the key, making it difficult for the key to become compromised. Instead, we can instruct the Secure Enclave to create the key, securely store it, and perform operations with it. The wallet receives only the output of these operations, such as encrypted data or a cryptographic signature verification outcome.
There are a few restrictions:
  • Is a hardware feature of the Apple A7 or later A-series processor. Only iOS devices with one of these processors or a MacBook Pro with the Touch Bar and Touch ID support this feature.
  • Stores only 256-bit elliptic curve private keys. These keys can only be used for creating and verifying cryptographic signatures, or for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (and by extension, symmetric encryption).
  • Can’t import preexisting keys. You must create keys directly inside the Secure Enclave. Not having a mechanism to transfer key data into or out of the Secure Enclave is fundamental to its security.
So what we can support in the wallet, using the Secure Enclave, are the keys used for the basic Bitcoin & Stacks accounts, including support for Schnorr (Taproot) signatures.
I’m not as familiar with some of the crypto stuff for Lightning, but it uses the Noise protocol which should theoretically work with this too.
The User doesn’t have to worry about backing up keys if they don’t want to. As long as the phone works, they’ll have access to their funds. Though this could pose an issue if the phone has issues, so presumably in the wallet there’d be an option to use a different option that you back it up with.
Maybe instead, we get the user to back the actual keys up (similar to Muun), then immediately encrypt them with a key on the Secure Enclave. This means that the user won’t have to use a password or faceid to keep the keys securely.
It’s a compromise of multiple factors, and the best way for that to happen is to suggest a recommended option, as well as other options, so the user can make their own choice depending on their security model. If you’re really worried about a state-level aggressor, you probably shouldn’t be using Apple devices in the first place.
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5 sats \ 0 replies \ @Crypto4210 19 Mar 2022
Completely agree. Wallets are far more complicated and prone to fatal errors for most people to use them. If Apple removes the complexity it will significantly help with adoption. I predict this will take 2-5 hardware release cycles to really go mainstream
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18 sats \ 8 replies \ @k00b 19 Mar 2022
I was talking to some people thinking deeply about this the other day. Today, I guess you can store private keys in the secure enclave but you can't use them without taking them out and putting them in memory which kind of defeats the purpose. If they could add that that would be significant.
However there are still issues with running lightning nodes on mobile phones. The node is effectively offline if the app isn't open. If they'd allow the key to sign data from the enclave and allow apps to be always-on in the background, we'd all be able to securely run lightning nodes from our phones.
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1 sat \ 3 replies \ @kevkevin 19 Mar 2022 freebie
would it would be possible to run a lighting node on a mobile device and then have a watch tower that can look over it? Maybe Apple can provide a watch tower for its users devices?
0 sats \ 3 replies \ @tomlaies 19 Mar 2022
Today, I guess you can store private keys in the secure enclave but you can't use them without taking them out and putting them in memory
Are you sure? According to the Bloomberg article the key is not accessible by the Operating System. But they don't support EC-DSA yet (I guess that means only RSA and Schnorr?).
Anyways, Apple is always happy to sell new features that are exclusive to new hardware. And they are desperate for new features - just look how much time they wasted on "better camera" in the presentation last year.
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11 sats \ 1 reply \ @phaedrus 19 Mar 2022
I think it’s possible to run code in the secure enclave so the keys would never leave it, just sign things and return them signed. It’s likely how FaceID etc works.
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0 sats \ 0 replies \ @k00b 19 Mar 2022
They were saying there isn't a public API for it (if I'm remembering correctly).
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10 sats \ 0 replies \ @k00b 19 Mar 2022
Oh hmmm, they might've been been wrong or I might've misunderstood them.
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1 sat \ 4 replies \ @DarthCoin 19 Mar 2022
iphones are just pure garbage Everybody in Bitcoinlandia screams loud about FOSS but then they go and install that nice FOSS wallet app on ishit phone totally closed source... is a not brainer that ishit are pure garbage and idiotic
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0 sats \ 3 replies \ @BlokchainB 20 Mar 2022
But apple makes great phones that are reliable, have, minimal bugs and great repair support. Bitcoin is software overall. If the masses are going to use it then the hardware used to access the bitcoin software better be top notch. If you want to use some FOSS hardware phone to make payments have it break then rely on shit customer service to get it fixed then be my guest.
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0 sats \ 2 replies \ @DarthCoin 20 Mar 2022
0 sats \ 0 replies \ @BlokchainB 56m But apple makes great phones that are reliable, have, minimal bugs and great repair support.
let me know when you will get rekt... please don't cry, you get what you deserve.
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0 sats \ 1 reply \ @BlokchainB 20 Mar 2022
I have real skills I don’t need bitcoin to succeed to make it in this world. Rekt or not I’ll be fine
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0 sats \ 0 replies \ @DarthCoin 20 Mar 2022
I would love to tell you soon "I TOLD YOU SO"... :) Like I did few years ago with friends using ishit phones and then they did this:
Ignore the warnings and you will get rekt, whatever skills you have... Is just a matter of time until apple shit will close access to your wallets. Remotely.
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0 sats \ 0 replies \ @PseudoRamdom 19 Mar 2022 freebie
Huh? You can already create keys on Secure Enclave
Storing Keys in the Secure Enclave
When you store a private key in the Secure Enclave, you never actually handle the key, making it difficult for the key to become compromised. Instead, you instruct the Secure Enclave to create the key, securely store it, and perform operations with it. You receive only the output of these operations, such as encrypted data or a cryptographic signature verification outcome.
Maybe they're missing the SecKeyAlgorithm used for generating the keys? I'm not proficient in cryptography :)