You don't have enough practice with wallets to understand how powerful is steganography. If is a bad practice, please break it. You will get 1BTC.
The original image is not uploaded to the internet, but either kept in your cloud or on a physical device. You've already admitted to that in a previous comment, iirc from a previous conversation we've had. Which means that if your cloud is infiltrated by feds or your device is stolen, retrieving the wallet from the image will be a lot easier.
Using something like StegCracker is pretty easy, and there are other methods if that doesn't work. Take it from someone who works in the field.
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StegCracker is pretty easy,
nope, it is not so easy. And you have too many assumptions (ifs) in your statement that will not reach that seed. So again, you cannot take out the seed. Is that "not safe"? No.
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All depends on what kinds of resources are accessible to your adversary.
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I put 12 words in one of my guides. Please find them and take the same wallet.
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There are several dozen words from the seed word pool in that post, and that's still a relatively high level on entropy (unless you kept the words in the correct order, in which case it's lower).
But here's the point: (!!!)
Why in the world would you lower the security of a seed phrase from 12 out of 2048 words to 12 out of <100? There's no reason to advise anyone to do that. It's cool you're trying to illustrate the concept of entropy to people, but maybe don't advise anyone to go about that kind of thing.
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Please show me you find the wallet seed and found the 1BTC in it. Otherwise are just assumptions.
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The fact that you're significantly lowering entropy is not an assumption, it's math. It's still probably not brute-forceable (for now), even with modern GPUs. But it's still inadvisable.
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But it's still inadvisable.
For noobs? Yes, totally. For me is just fine. Because I know what am I doing and I am very confident in my methods. I test them all.