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I'd be happy to clarify any specific points you find untenable. My description of BIP-110 and its mechanics is grounded in game theory and the incentives at play within the network. If you have concerns, I'm open to discussing them with you in more detail.
I would suggest that you first address the points @Scoresby raised in the OP, but beyond that for starters:
- You are wrong about the fork activating immediately upon reaching the threshold
- It makes no sense to claim that miners should signal late. If they support the proposal signaling early would help build momentum and be less risky.
- You misrepresent the potential downsides of being on the wrong side of the soft fork attempt
Scoresby's critique assumes that BIP-110 could fail to activate, but it can't. There's no timeout or "failed" state. Mandatory signaling forces lock-in at max_activation_height, regardless of organic support. The chain-split scenarios described rely on minority hashrate activation, but the 55% threshold prevents this.
I'd be interested in hearing a bit more about why you decided to list the two paths in the matrix as "Activates 55%+ signal" and "Does not Activate." My understanding of the BIP is that it will activate in September for all nodes running it regardless of how many blocks signal (if it doesn't activate sooner).
@melvincarvalho what is your nostr npub? plenty of fakes over there
Thanks for sacrificing your time so we didn’t have to. From what you show, Carvalho’s description is completely untenable.